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On July 1, 1989, slightly more than a year after enactment, the
new Alaska Corporations Code ("ACC") achieved its effective date.'
The delay was symbolic of the more than ten year struggle to craft a
statutory framework for profit seeking corporate enterprise which
would respond to the challenges and opportunities facing Alaskans.
Within the state, the content of the new code will be studied by busi-
nesspersons and their legal advisors for the obvious reason that it now
governs their affairs. Beyond the business community, Alaskans will
find strong evidence of a social contract articulated by a legislature
fully conscious of both the costs and benefits of corporate enterprise.
The terms of this contract will pose special interest for Native Alas-
kans whose embrace of the corporate form and future was mandated
when Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA") in 1971.2 Alaskans generally and specifically affected
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1. 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws oh. 166, § 7 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this Act apply
on and after July 1, 1989 to:
(1) a domestic corporation organized under the former Alaska
Business Corporations Act [ALASKA STAT. § ] 10.05 existing on
July 1, 1989;
(2) a foreign corporation that is authorized to do or does business
in the state on or after July 1, 1989;
(3) actions by a director, officer, or shareholder of a corporation
described in (1) and (2) of this subsection on and after July 1, 1989.
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1986). In 1987, the Report of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs set the background for an Act Amending the Alaska Na-
tive Claims Settlement Act to Provide Alaska Natives with Certain Options for the
Continued Ownership of Lands and Corporate Shares Received Pursuant to the Act,
and for Other Purposes. The Committee explained the imposition of the corporate
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will find the ACC the most significant accomplishment to date of the
Alaska Code Revision Commission ("the Commission"), a permanent
form upon the Natives of Alaska in the greater context of a sweeping land settlement
scheme:
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was passed in 1971 to settle
the long-standing claims of the Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts of Alaska
based upon aboriginal use and occupancy. The Native rights to lands in
Alaska had been recognized and preserved in the treaty with Russia acquir-
ing Alaska; the Territorial Enabling Act; and the Alaska Statehood Act.
Between the Treaty of Cession of 1967 [sic] [1867] and the enactment of
ANCSA in 1971, Congress acted on at least six occasions to protect the
Native use of lands. In the 1884 Organic Act establishing a civil government
for Alaska, Congress provided that:
the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed
in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or
now claimed by them but the terms under which such persons may
acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by
Congress.
In 1891, Congress established a reservation for the Metlakatla Indians in
southeast Alaska. In 1906, Congress passed the Alaska Native Allotment
Act permitting Natives of Alaska to select tracts of lands to be held in trust
for them by the United States. To further protect Native use of lands, Con-
gress enacted, in 1926, the Native Townsite Act which provided for the con-
veyance of public lands to trustees representing village people. In 1936,
Congress amended the Indian Reorganization Act to make several provi-
sions of that Act applicable to Alaska Natives. Finally, in 1958, Congress
passed the Alaska Statehood Act which provided that the State of Alaska
disclaimed all rights in
any lands or other property (including fishing rights), the right or
title to which may be held by any Indian, Eskimo or Aleut... or is
held by the United States in trust for said Natives.
In addition, the Statehood Act provides that State land selections could be
made only from "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved" public lands.
The existence of Native land rights and claims presented an obstacle to
the settlement and development of Alaska. As a consequence, Congress be-
gan consideration of legislation to resolve the outstanding land claims con-
flicts, resulting in the enactment of ANCSA in 1971. ANCSA extinguished
the aboriginal title of Natives to lands in Alaska. In return, ANCSA pro-
vided for the conveyance to the natives of approximately 44,000,000 acres of
land and payment of $962,000,000 as a monetary settlement.
To provide a framework for the implementation of the provisions of the
Act and for the administration of Native lands and funds, Congress departed
from the conventional method of dealing with Indian tribes and settling tri-
bal land claims. ANCSA adopted the corporate structure as the system to
carry into effect the terms of the settlement.
Alaska was divided into twelve geographic regions, with each region
being composed, as far as practical, of Natives and Native villages having a
common language and heritage and sharing common interests. These re-
gions approximated areas covered by the operations of then-existing Native
associations and organizations. The Act required the Natives of each region
to incorporate under Alaska State law [as] a regional Corporation to conduct
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commission of the legislature established in 1976. 3 The Commission
functions to provide the Alaska Legislature with background studies,
analysis, and statutory formulations facilitating what the late Ben W.
Heineman termed "continuous private law reform."'4
business for profit. The articles of incorporation of these Regional Corpora-
tions were required to include provisions necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of ANCSA.
In addition, ANCSA provided that Native villages within each region
which met certain standard[s] were entitled to share in the settlement provi-
sions and were required to establish profit or non-profit corporations under
Alaska State law.
The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a roll of all
Natives, one-fourth or more Alaska Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut blood, who
were born on or before, and living, on December 18, 1971. With certain
exceptions not here relevant, each Native on that roll had to be enrolled to
one of the twelve regions and, were [sic] appropriate, to one of the several
villages within such region.
The Regional Corporation was required by the Act to issue to each
Native enrolled in that region 100 shares of the stock of the corporation.
Except for transfers pursuant to a court decree of separation, divorce or
child support, the Act provided that these shares of stock would be inaliena-
ble for a period of twenty years after the date of enactment of ANCSA, i.e.,
until December 18, 1991. Stock issued by a Native village corporation was
made subject to the same restrictions on alienation.
Finally, ANCSA [provided] for the distribution of the land and mone-
tary settlement among the twelve regions and, within each region, between
the regional corporation and its several village corporations. Through this
process, Alaska natives became shareholders in regional and village corpora-
tions which, in turn, were to hold title to lands conveyed under the Act.
H.R. REP. No. 100-31, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1987).
3. ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.075 (1985). The Commission consists of a member of
each house of the legislature, three public members who are not employees of the state
government, a designee of the governor, a designee of the chief justice of the supreme
court, and a designee of the Alaska Bar Association. The enabling legislation obli-
gates the Commission to "examine the statutes of the state and judicial decisions to
discover defects and anachronisms in the law; ... [and to] recommend changes in law
needed to eliminate antiquated and inadequate rules of law and to bring the law into
harmony with current needs and conditions." Id. § 24.20.075(c)(1),(4).
Subsection (f) declares that:
The commission shall submit its reports and recommendations, and draft
legislation as to revision of law, to the Legislative Council and shall dis-
tribute them to the governor, members of the legislature, and the chief jus-
tice of the supreme court. Each draft of legislation submitted by the
commission shall be accompanied by a sectional analysis. The commission
shall prepare the sectional analysis using language that is understandable to
a layman.
Id. § 24.20.075(f).
4. More than forty years ago, Heineman called for the creation of a law revision
commission in Illinois.
Analysis must proceed with the recognition that without self-created
assistance the legislature is incapable of engaging in continuous private law
reform. The ever increasing complexity of our society has converted the
modem legislature into a great public service institution. The three R's of
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The new code may prove of interest outside of Alaska because it
departs from the current vogue of adopting off-the-rack model legisla-
tion. The .laska Legislature did not, however, set about to reinvent
the wheel or fail to take advantage of the fruits of recent statutory
revisions in major jurisdictions, as well as of the work of the American
Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law
and the American Law Institute. Corporate statutes in Delaware,5
New York6 and California 7 cast major influence over the evolved con-
tent of the ACC. So, too, did the original Model Act upon which
modem legislation - roads, revenues, and regulation - preempt its time. It
is also widely recognized that the legislature does not initiate legislation. It
accepts and rejects, with or without modification, but the sources of the law
lie elsewhere. These sources are today well understood. In the main, they
consist of the administrative departments, units of local government and the
lobby. In the field of public law the deficiencies in this method of selecting
the subjects of legislation are not insurmountable. The administrative de-
partments are well qualified to bring to the attention of the legislature de-
fects or the need for innovation in the statutes with whose daily
administration they are charged.... And with respect to affirmative propos-
als by private interests, there are available in the administrative departments
or among the other governmental agencies informed persons to advise the
legislative committees with respect to the effect of proposed legislation. In
the public law field there is, therefore, a regular flow from external sources of
proposed legislation upon which the legislature is able to exercise its modem
functions of acceptance, modification or rejection.
But once we leave the domain of public law and enter the field of pri-
vate law, these sources are wholly inadequate. Not only is there no regular
and selective flow of grist to the legislative mill, but as to what there is, the
legislature in general is not able to obtain the benefit of a disinterested, in-
formed scrutiny. What has been everybody's business has become nobody's
business. Before the legislature will revise the substantive private law, it
must be satisfied not merely that a defect exists, but that the proposed cure is
not worse than the disease. If substantive revision is to meet with regular
legislative success, its proponents must be disinterested, skilled, and accepta-
ble to the legislature. What is needed, in short, is a public agency having the
responsibility for continuous review of private law, equipped both in terms
of personnel and facilities to discharge its responsibilities, and conducting
itself in such a fashion as to insure the maximum acceptance of its ultimate
recommendations by the legislature, the bar and the public.
Heineman, A Law Revision Commission for Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REv. 697, 701-02
(1948) (footnotes omitted).
5. Del. Gen. Corp. Law (West 1969). The Delaware General Corporation Law
("DGCL") underwent its most recent major revision in 1953. 8 Del. C. 1953.
6. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law (McKinney 1986). The New York Business Corpora-
tion Law ("BCL") was substantially revised in 1961 and became a law on Apr. 24,
1961. Like the ACC, the BCL was given a delayed effective date and went into effect
on Sept. 1, 1963. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 2001 (McKinney 1986).
7. Cal. Gen. Corp. Law (West 1977). The California General Corporation Law
("GCL") was completely revised in 1975, and given an effective date of Jan. 1, 1977.
1975 CAL. STAT. ch. 682, § 7.
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Alaska's original Business Corporation Act had been predicated.8
Both the Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA") and
'the American Law Institute's ("ALI") Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance were formulated after the ACC was already in substantial
draft form.9 A fortunate consequence of the long gestation period was
the opportunity to compare the treatment given in the RMBCA and
the ALI recommendations to the proposed content of the ACC. 10 Nu-
merous revisions were incorporated reflecting the consensus that these
sources presented superior analytical or drafting approaches.
Notwithstanding, the ACC retains the distinct quality of bespoke
legislation.
A. The Target of Revision: The Alaska Business Corporation Act
After achieving statehood, Alaska functioned with a version of
the Model Business Corporation Act. From the original Model Act,
the former Alaska Business Corporation Act inherited two distinc-
tively dysfunctional qualities. The first centered on content: what had
been included and omitted from statutory coverage. The second arose
from the disorganized manner in which the included materials were
expressed.
Though probably inadequate on the day that it was adopted in a
new state with no common law treatment of business problems, by
1979 the Commission had no difficulty in concluding that the Alaska
Business Corporation Act was short on answers to a growing list of
8. The original Alaska Business Corporation Act was enacted by the first legisla-
ture as chapter 126 of the Alaska Session Laws of 1957. By the time the Alaska Code
Revision Commission began its study, the memories of members who had served in
that session some twenty-two years earlier united on the premise that Oregon's ex-
isting corporation code was used as the basis, if not the text, of the original Alaska
legislation. This may be so. It is clear that Oregon had adopted the then infant Model
Act as the basis for its 1953 revision of what became Chapter 57 of the Oregon Re-
vised Statutes dealing with Private Corporations. Letter from John W. Abbott to Sen-
ator Bettye Fahrenkamp (Apr. 10, 1987). The transmittal letter was printed along
with the official comments in the House and Senate Joint Journal Supplement. H. &
S. JT. JOURNAL Supp., No. 9, at 1 (May 15, 1987).
9. The RMBCA was adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Sec-
tion of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association in
mid-1984. An exposure draft was circulated in 1983, approximately two years after
the circulation of the first exposure draft of the ACC.
10. The one year delay in the effective date of the ACC provided an opportunity
for the Alaska Code Revision Commission to review the first eight tentative drafts of
the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations. The Commission recommended amending section 10.06.450 to give
statutory expression to the business judgment rule set forth in section 4.01(c) of Tenta-
tive Draft No. 4. The amendment, proposed as section 39 of Combined Senate and




recurrent legal problems. The situation can probably be traced to the
strategies employed in devising the Model Business Corporation Act
and to the circumstances which surrounded its creation. As explained
in an official publication of the American Bar Foundation, the Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws prepared the Model Act working from the
1946 revision of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933.11 It
followed in the wake of thirty years of failed efforts to secure accept-
ance of a Uniform Business Corporation Act. Between 1928 and 1950,
the proposed uniform legislation managed to gain adoption in Louisi-
ana and Washington and exerted a major influence over the 1929 revi-
sion of Idaho's corporate code. The Uniform Act was withdrawn in
1958.12 Whether influenced by the failure to gain acceptance of uni-
form legislation respecting corporate entities, or by its premise on the
statutory law of Illinois, a jurisdiction with a sizeable body of deci-
sional business law, the Model Act was an erratic statute affording
lavish coverage of some areas, while virtually ignoring important top-
ics of corporate governance and social accountability. 13 Whatever vir-
tue these gaps may have afforded in deferring to local statutory or
judicially crafted rules, the importation of such a product into Alaska
was devoid of such supplements. As a result, both the lay and legal
communities were frequently forced to guesstimate an Alaska position
on an issue which was not covered in the Alaska statute, and upon
which the decisional laws of neighboring states might well be in sub-
stantial disagreement!' 4
The structure of the Model Act frequently hampered the reader.
Though the Act was organized under eleven major topics, the reader
11. MODE.L BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN., § 1 comment 4.02 (1960).
12. Id. § 1 comment 4.03.
13. Sometimes the elaborate treatment was devoted to rather insignificant topics.
Fully nine of the eighty-eight sections of Article 1, Substantive Provisions, of the
Alaska Business Corporation Act were devoted to the corporate name. ALASKA
STAT. §§ 10.05.021-.042 (1985) (repealed 1988). By contrast, the shareholder's deriv-
ative action was totally omitted from the coverage of the Act.
The mere numbers of sections do not reflect the very significant expansion in
statutory treatment of corporate topics afforded by the ACC. The new code consists
of 247 substantive provisions. By contrast, the supplanted Alaska Business Corpora-
tion Act ("ABCA") contained 274 sections. In actuality, the seemingly expansive
scope of the ABCA was accomplished by taking the 145 sections of the Model Act
and simply breaking them down into short sections expressing the content of what had
been a single, more comprehensive treatment in the Model Act.
14. A ready example may be found in the recurrent business problem addressed in
former Alaska Statutes section 10.05.8 10. There we find that persons who assume to
act as a corporation without authority are jointly and severally liable for the debts and
liabilities incurred or arising as a result of such action. The language had been taken
from section 146 of the Model Business Corporation Act and added to the ABCA by
section 152 of chapter 126 of the Alaska Session Laws of 1957. Although it was
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could never be certain that all of the provisions relating to the indi-
cated topic had been included within the organizational structure.
The Alaska version did not escape this defect. Provisions dealing with
shares and corporate capital were strewn from the middle through the
concluding sections interrupted by statutory treatment of directors,
books, and records and shareholder rights.' 5 An even more glaring
defect was found in the separation, by nearly two hundred sections, of
the basic rules on voting of shares' 6 and the provision on
supermajority voting requirements at the shareholder level. 17
B. The Policies and Goals of the Code Revision Commission
The challenge inherent in crafting a new corporations code was
not limited to technical questions of plain expression and clear organi-
zation. The decades following statehood raised major social issues re-
specting the corporate entity and its role in society. The Commission's
survey of the corporation statutes of California, Delaware, New York,
Oregon, and Washington revealed a major philosophical debate over
shareholder rights versus management prerogatives. The polar posi-
tions in that debate were clearly occupied by California and Delaware.
California's General Corporation Code continues a tradition in that
state of enhancing the rights of shareholders while curtailing the struc-
tural position of incumbent management. 18 By contrast, Delaware is
literally positioned several hundred sections following the statutory provisions on cor-
porate formation, the confusion which this section invited only began by its odd place-
ment.
Section 146 has been interpreted by the Washington Court of Appeals as having
codified the common law on promoter's liability. Heintze Corp. v. Northwest Tech-
Manuals, Inc., 7 Wash. App. 759, 502 P.2d 486 (1972). Two years later, the Oregon
Supreme Court read the identical Model Act language and concluded that section 146
had nothing to do with promoter's liability but was aimed at extinguishing the doc-
trine of de facto incorporation! Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon v. Alexander, 269 Or.
389, 525 P.2d 135 (1974). On the day it was repealed in favor of Alaska Statutes
section .220, effective July 1, 1989, there had never been an Alaska appellate interpre-
tation. During this entire period, what was an Alaska practitioner or trial judge to
do?
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.060 (1957) (repealed 1988) (concerning the
creation, division into classes, and issuance of shares). Fifty-one sections later, the
reader encountered section 10.05.204, which detailed the treatment of outstanding
classes with respect to the payment of dividends.
16. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.156 (1957) (repealed 1988).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.801 (1957) (repealed 1988). Similar befuddlement
awaited anyone consulting the Act for coverage of actions by shareholders. The sec-
tion on meetings of shareholders was found at section 10.05.138. More than two hun-
dred sections and ten articles later the reader would discover section 10.05.807 which
governed actions by shareholders without a meeting.
18. A few examples will suffice to establish the bias of the California position.
Contrary to the content of the overwhelming majority of state statutes, California has
insisted on limiting director terms to a single year while prohibiting the classification
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widely viewed as maintaining a statute sympathetic to the concerns
and interests of incumbent management. 19 The position of the
of the board. By contrast, the overwhelming majority of state statutes contain provi-
sions such as section 8.06 of the RMBCA, which permits a board containing nine or
more directors to be divided into three classes with directors serving staggered three
year terms. The ability of a disgruntled majority of the shares to alter the control of a
board with which the shareholders are disenchanted is never more than 364 days away
in California. In jurisdictions which provide for classified boards and staggered direc-
tor terms it may take two full years before a similar opportunity to replace a majority
of the incumbent directors is at hand.
In 1989 the California Legislature amended the General Corporation Law to per-
mit any "listed corporation" to amend its articles or bylaws to provide for a classified
board and staggered director terms. The major concession is extended only to those
corporations formed under the GCL which have outstanding shares listed on the New
York or American Stock Exchanges or with securities designated as qualified for trad-
ing as national market security on the National Association of Security Dealers Auto-
matic Quotation System. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301, 301.5 (Deering 1977 & Supp.
1990).
California was the first state to require by statute that a director could be re-
moved by the shareholders at any time and for any reason agreeable to a majority of
the share interest. This concept has enjoyed a favorable response in other states, but is
generally an optional as opposed to mandatory condition. In 1989 the California Leg-
islature amended the GCL to add protection to directors elected to a classified board
of a listed corporation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 303 (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1990).
19. For a view that Delaware has been leading a "race for the bottom" in its
efforts to cater to the aspirations of incumbent management, see Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974). Professor
Cary's recommended solution was federal legislation establishing minimum standards
of managerial responsibility on corporate directors and officers. Id. at 700-13.
The Cary position provoked considerable debate. For an argument that, at least
for publicly traded entities, securities markets would operate in a self-corrective reac-
tion against the abuse of shareholders, see Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). For additional
perspectives and analysis, see Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. L. 259 (1980).
In the opinion of Professor Daniel R. Fischel, Professor Cary and his adherents
have fundamentally misunderstood the corporate form of firm organization. Fischel
rejects the view that corporate law should center on shareholders as the "owners" of
the corporation. Instead, he opts for the view that a corporate entity "serves as a
nexus for a set of contractual relationships among individuals. The individuals in-
clude the 'owners' of labor, material and capital inputs and also the consumers of the
firm's output." Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 917-18 (1982).
Given his differing perspective, it is not surprising that Fisehel does not view statutory
or decisional law which sees management as having obligations to a variety of constit-
uencies as racing for the "bottom." Indeed, he suggests that for publicly traded cor-
porations re-incorporation in Delaware seems to actually benefit the financial returns
to shareholder investors. Id. at 920.
Fischel goes beyond the attempt to refute Professor Cary. He suggests that the
adverse commentary which Cary began threatens a long-term negative impact upon
investor interests. The vehicle for imparting this harm is the destabilization of Dela-
ware decisional law in terms of its precedential value. Fischel provides an analysis of
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Commission was set forth in the letter of transmittal from Chairman
John W. Abbott to the Alaska Legislative Council:20
An initial decision of the Commission was to avoid mandating
either the Delaware or California extremes. Instead, the Commis-
sion sought to design a statute that was first and foremost under-
standable to the average individual desiring to do business in the
corporate form. Both the organization and content of the new act
are designed to clearly impart the minimum requirements estab-
lished by the state as a price tag for the privilege of doing business in
the corporate form; to set forth the choices which ought to be made
by each group seeking incorporation with respect to the division of
powers between shareholders and directors; and to standardize the
methods of essential reporting on corporate activities made to
shareholders and the state.21
To vindicate those policy choices the Commission set three goals
which were to shape the revision effort.
First, the new code had to be organized in a manner which a
layperson could comprehend and which gathered into a disciplined
framework all provisions relating to general topics.
Second, within that framework there had to be a fulsome statu-
tory expression of legal policy on issues likely to confront persons de-
siring to do business in the corporate form in Alaska. As a jurisdiction
three decisions: Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), on remand, 401 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979),
rev'd, 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981), and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981). While raising specific objections to the result in each case, Fischel asserts that
their collective vice is that the Supreme Court of Delaware seems more interested in
refuting the idea that the jurisdiction is anti-shareholder than in providing a predict-
able result given longstanding precedent. Fischel, supra, at 923-42.
20. Letter from John W. Abbott to Senator Bettye Fahrenkamp (Apr. 10, 1987),
reprinted in H. & S. JT. JOURNAL Supp., No. 9, at 1-9 (May 15, 1987).
21. Id. at 3. The position espoused in Chairman Abbott's letter of transmittal
closely parallels the views of then professor and now United States Court of Appeals
Judge Ralph K. Winter.
Intervention in private transactions which impose no social cost can be justi-
fied only as a means of reducing the costs to the private parties. Thus, a
prime function of state corporation codes is to supply standard terms which
reduce the transaction costs, and thereby increase the benefits, of investing
by eliminating costly bargaining which might otherwise accompany many
routine corporate dealings. But substituting a mandatory legal rule for bar-
gaining also may impose a cost in the form of the elimination of alternatives
which the parties might prefer.
Winter, supra note 19, at 259.
The ACC is not totally permissive. In the article on corporate finance the new
code establishes mandatory rules respecting the circumstances in which the corpora-
tion may engage in a distribution of its assets to equitable owners. See ALASKA STAT.
§§ 10.06.358-.365 (1989) and the discussion of prohibited distributions. The rationale
for this departure is one unlikely to draw objection from Judge Winter - that the
"parties" in question include nonconsenting corporate creditors.
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with a small body of common law addressing corporate problems,
Alaska could not afford a bare bones statute confident of case law sup-
plementation. The commissioners were insistent that, while the busi-
ness community could adjust to a clear affirmative or negative answer
to nearly any question, neither social policy nor business efficiency
could be achieved by leaving the conclusion in doubt. 22 The challenge
was to pursue the goal of comprehensive legislative expression while
maintaining a philosophical neutrality. The solution was to legislate
default rules which would operate in the absence of specific provisions
of the articles or bylaws. 23
Finally, there were to be comprehensive commentaries written for
each section of the ACC which would identify the scope of the provi-
sion and the change, if any, which it worked in former Alaska law.
24
Given the frequent instances in which the new code would continue
22. The involuntary posture of Native Alaskans with respect to their dependence
upon the corporate model conferred an extra urgency in the agenda to make the law
as clear and comprehensive as possible. See supra note 2.
23. This solution builds upon the successful experiment begun more than half a
century ago with section 18 of the Uniform Partnership Act. The Act declares that
"[t]he rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be deter-
mined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules . . . ." UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
24. The official comments are especially useful when the new provision is without
precedent in former Alaska law and has been premised upon a statute in another
jurisdiction. If the Alaska version differs from the source, or if there are judicial inter-
pretations of the source statute which are not considered desirable, the comments
explain the differences and iterate legislative disapproval of the decisional law. The
following example is typical of the Commission's work:
Official Comment to ACC Section 10.06.325.
REDEMPTION OF SHARES; CREATION OF SINKING FUND; RE-
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS.
SCOPE: ACC sec. 325 covers three crucial questions:
(1) it establishes the right of the corporation to create classes or series
of shares which are redeemable at the option of the corporate issuer; (2) it
forbids (subject to an exception for an open-end investment company) the
creation of shares which vest a right to demand redemption in the sharehold-
ers; and (3) it permits the creation outside of the terms of the articles agree-
ments which provide for the redemption or repurchase of shares of the
corporate issuer.
The first and second of the topics covered by sec. 325 are sufficiently
detailed as to clearly indicate the disposition of the legislature toward case
law. The Ihird topic, covered by the provisions of sec. 325(c), address[es] a
matter of some complexity and disparate case law development. In general
the ACC treats either the redemption or repurchase of shares by the corpo-
rate issuer as a "distribution" and thus makes it subject to the financial re-
straints of Article 4, sees. 358-90.
Beyond these limitations it is the intention of the legislature to subject
the decision to redeem or repurchase shares to the duties of care and loyalty
otherwise imposed upon directors and corporate officers. Such concepts
have been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court of Alaska as impacting
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the policies of established law, the "scope notes" were to resolve con-
flicts between lines of decisional law which had grown up outside
Alaska respecting the same or similar statutory language. 25
upon those who de jure or de facto exercise the powers of corporate manage-
ment. See Wolf v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 770 (Alaska 1977).
Granting full recognition to such fiduciary duties does not support the
conclusion that either redemption or repurchase must, in all circumstances,
be employed on a pro rata basis to all shares of the class or series. Cases
such as General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N.J. Eq. 326,
331, 129 A. 244, 246 (1925), to the extent that they would establish such an
absolute proposition, are disapproved.
If those vested with the powers of corporate management can establish
a valid business purpose for the entry into an agreement to redeem or repur-
chase some but not all of the shares of a given class or series those who are
not extended the terms of such a transaction have no complaint. See Martin
v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295, 302
(Del. Super. Ct. 1952).
CHANGE IN FORMER ALASKA LAW: ACC sec. 325 is new and
has no precedent in former Alaska law. It is taken from GCL Section
402(a), (b) and (d), with the deletion of subsection (c) which makes explicit
the requirement that in every corporation there be at least one class or series
of shares which bear the ultimate financial risks of the enterprise and are
thus nonredeemable. This provision was considered unnecessary in the for-
mer California Act, has never been litigated, and is deemed implicit in the
ACC without the need of further expression.
H. & S. JT. JOURNAL Supp., No. 9, at 45-46 (May 15, 1987).
25. The legislative expression of approval or disapproval of lines of case authority
should go a long way in guiding both the bar and the trial judiciary in interpreting
language with a Model Act heritage. The following Comment is typical:
Official Comment to A CC Section 1 0.06.333.
FORFEITURE OF SHARES FOR DEFAULT IN PAYMENT.
SCOPE: ACC sec. 333 establishes the general rights of the corporate
issuer in the event of default by a subscriber in the payment obligation for
shares. The scheme is to recognize that the payment obligation has the dig-
nity of any debt due and owing to the corporation and as such may be as-
serted in any general civil process. In addition, the bylaws may have
provided further remedies which are subject to the general policy of the law
that consequences are to be remedial rather than punitive in character. The
test for punitive qualities would be an exaction of any sum greater than the
consequential and incidental damages inflicted upon the corporate issuer by
virtue of the breach.
Sec. 333 reflects the legislature's appreciation that shares allotted to a
subscriber who has breached his contract inhibit the corporate efforts to
raise capital; thus there is an explicit provision for the forfeiture of rights
upon the observance of the statutory notice and grace period. There is a
split among common law authorities as to whether a corporate issuer which
has exercised a right to forfeit the subscriber's interest in shares may seek
further recovery in the event of a deficiency after resale of the shares.
In furtherance of the general policy aimed at compensation of the ag-
grieved issuer, damages which are not recoverable through forfeiture and
resale may be asserted against the breaching subscriber. Cases such as At-
lantic Dynamite Co. v. Andrews, 97 Mich. 466, 56 N.W. 858 (1893), are
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C. The Implementation
The first decision of the Alaska Code Revision Commission was
to adopt the organizational scheme of the New York Business Corpo-
ration Law. As a result the new code is compiled in thirteen articles,
each of which has sought to exhaust the statutory treatment of major
topics. The scheme is roughly chronological in terms of the forma-
tion, operation and dissolution of a corporate entity:
Article 1. Corporate purposes and powers
Article 2. Name and service of process
Article 3. Formation of corporations
Article 4. Corporate finance
Article 5. Shareholders
Article 6. Directors and officers
Article 7. Amendments and changes
Article 8. Organic change
Article 9. Dissolution
Article 10. Foreign corporations
Article 11. Reports, fees, and penalties
Article 12. Miscellaneous provisions
Article 13. General provisions26
Following article 13 are specific transitional provisions and modifica-
tions to the Alaska Court Rules.
II. SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS IN THE NEW ALASKA
CORPORATIONS CODE
What follows is a summary of the significant provisions of the
ACC relating to the formation of corporations and the new restraints
upon the distribution of corporate assets. A more detailed analysis of
approved and those typified by American Well & Prospecting Co. v. Blake-
more, 184 Cal. 343, 193 P. 779 (1920) are disapproved.
CHANGE IN FORMER ALASKA LAW: ACC sec. 333 is a reenact-
ment of former [Alaska Statutes section] 10.05.093 which was premised
upon Section 17 of the MBCA. There is no substantive change. The terms
"penalties" and "penalty" have been changed to "remedies" and "remedy"
to reflect the approved case law construction.
H. & S. JT. JOURNAL SUPP., No. 9, at 47-48 (May 15, 1987).
26. The Commission's first exposure draft placed the general provisions at the
beginning of the statute as article 1. Their current placement at the end of the lengthy
statute results from a standard drafting practice in Alaska from which the new code
was not excepted. Fortunately, this standard does not apply to scriptural expression
in Alaska lest Genesis and the account of creation be reserved as a final surprise for
the reader.
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these points, as well as those not discussed in this article, may be
found by consulting the official comments.27
A. Corporate Purposes and Powers
Article 1 contains no major departures from the content of the
former Alaska Business Corporation Act and related common law.
There are, however, some important refinements. Section .010 con-
tains an expression which alerts the reader that, while the default
norm is that a corporation will enjoy all of the powers of a natural
person, such powers may be curtailed, modified, or eliminated by aptly
drafted provisions in the articles of incorporation. 28
27. A preliminary set of official comments was printed in the House and Senate
Joint Journal Supplement of May 15, 1987. The 1989 amendments are noted in the
Joint Journal Supplement of Mar. 6, 1989. Official comments reflecting the content of
the 1989 amendments in their final form have been prepared and are in the custody of
the Legislative Affairs Agency.
28. The 1989 amendments, contained in section 1 of chapter 82 of the Alaska
Session Laws of 1989, created a potentially significant amendment to section .010(17).
As amended, subsection (17) confers upon a corporation formed under the ACC the
powers of a limited or general partner or a party to a joint venture. The original text
had granted corporations the powers of a limited or general partnership or venturer.
The amended language conforms section .010 to former Alaska Statutes section
10.05.009(18). In what might strike some as a strange manifestation of governmental
concern, the change was motivated by fear that, as originally enacted, the ACC lan-
guage might be interpreted to restrict the ability of Alaska corporations to expose
their assets to manipulation or control by persons who were neither directors nor
shareholders. This danger is very real and is courted by a corporate election to par-
ticipate in a partnership or joint venture. To the extent that partnership or venture
assets prove insufficient, the corporate partner is jointly or severally liable to firm
creditors or tort victims. See UNIF. PARTNERSHip AcT §§ 13, 14, 15, 6 U.L.A. 163,
173, 174 (1914). The fact that the corporate partner dissented from decisions of a
majority of the partners which generated the third party claims provides no defense.
A drafting lawyer who has pointed these dangers out to a client contemplating incor-
poration or a corporate investment may minimize the risk by placing apt provision in
the corporate articles forbidding such association.
There is an important issue upon which neither the original nor amended provi-
sions of the ACC take any position. In the event that a corporation is used as a
general partner in the formation and operation of a limited partnership, do limited
partners who participate in their capacity as officers or agents of the corporate general
risk loss of their personal limited liability? Courts which pondered this question in the
context of section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act have reached diametri-
cally opposing conclusions. The Supreme Court of Texas has squarely held that lim-
ited partners who function as officers of a corporate general take part in "control of
the business" and forfeit their limited liability. They are liable as general partners
under section 15 of the Uniform Partnership Act. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526
S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). In 1976 the Court of Appeals of Washington refused to
follow Delaney and expressly declined to find a loss of limited liability. Frigidaire
Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 634, 544 P.2d 781 (Ct. App.
1976). The non-uniform content of section 303 of the Revised Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act adopted in California, Washington, and Colorado suggests the belief of
1990]
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The issues of ultra vires activity, limitations on authority of cor-
porate agents, and unauthorized contracts or conveyances binding do-
mestic and foreign corporations are either given redrafted or initial
statutory expression in the new code. The default grant to a corpora-
tion of all the powers of a natural person dramatically reduces the
potential that a given transaction will be beyond corporate powers.
However, to the extent that drafters of corporate articles take advan-
tage of the invitation in section .010 to limit the powers of a specific
corporate entity, transactions that transgress those limitations must be
addressed. 29 The general policy of ACC section .015 is to severely
restrict the ability of the corporation to use the doctrine of ultra vires
in either a defensive or offensive manner. 30 Such a transaction is valid
notwithstanding the fact that the corporation was without capacity or
power to do the act or make or receive the transfer.31 A similar policy
operates to protect the interest of third parties if the defect in the
transaction lies in the authority of the corporate agent rather than the
powers of the entity. ACC sections .020 and .025 resolve the rights
and liabilities of the betrayed corporate entity when faced with an un-
authorized contract or conveyance. Section .020 recognizes that the
real authority of a corporate agent may be conferred by, or implied
from, the articles, bylaws or action of the board. If the transaction is
those legislatures that Delaney is not inconsistent with the provisions of the new lim-
ited partnership statute. See D. FESSLER, ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION FOR
PERSONS IN QUEST OF PROFIT 264-67 (2d ed. 1986).
29. Under the ACC a provision limiting or restricting the business in which the
corporation may engage or the powers of the corporate entity must be placed in the
articles or be totally without legal effect. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(l)(G) (1989).
30. A defensive use would assert the plea of ultra vires to declare that the contract
with a third party was either void or voidable on grounds that the corporate party
acted beyond its powers. It has been more than one hundred years since courts were
hospitable to such claims. See Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, L.R. 7
H.L. 653 (E. & I App. 1875). The new code regulates the standing, procedures and
remedies that may flow from defensive use of the doctrine. ACC section .015(a)(1)
would permit a shareholder to commence a derivative action seeking to enjoin the
doing of an act or transfer which is beyond the powers of the entity. In such an
equitable proceeding the court is empowered, if all the parties to the contract are
parties to the suit, to set aside and enjoin performance. Damages of a reparatory
nature may be allowed to an innocent third party, but he may not be awarded an
expectation interest in the form of anticipated profits.
An affirmative or offensive use of the doctrine is also permitted under the ACC.
Subsection (a)(2) permits the corporate entity either directly or derivatively to seek
damages against any former or incumbent director, officer, or incorporator for any
loss or damage arising from that individual's unauthorized act.
The ACC continues the Alaska practice of investing the supervisory authority of
the state in the Commission for Commerce and Economic Development rather than
the Attorney General. To that end, the traditional quo warranto proceeding, articu-
lated in section .015(a)(3), is vested in the commissioner.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.015(a) (1989).
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not covered by express or implied real authority, the betrayed corpora-
tion is disabled from directly asserting the defect.32 Under section
.025, if the transaction was within the apparent authority of an agent it
is binding upon both the entity and the third party.33 This same ACC
provision expressly recognizes ratification as an independent basis for
establishing the liability and rights of the corporate principal for an
unauthorized contract or conveyance. 34
32. Id. However, both a shareholder and the state are given standing to assert the
lack of authority in seeking injunctive relief. Such relief is conditioned upon the third
party not having acquired rights under section .025(a). For all practical purposes, this
means that the corporate agent acted with apparent authority. Section .020(3) clearly
establishes the right of a shareholder to bring a derivative action against the officers or
directors of the corporation either for acting as a faithless agent or for so conducting
the affairs of the corporation as principal that it is liable to a third party under the
terms of section .025(a).
33. While the principle has been erroneously formulated in many judicial opin-
ions, the Alaska Supreme Court has been consistent in understanding the elements
which must be established to shift the burden of a faithless agent's activity from the
deceived third party to the betrayed principal. "Apparent authority to do an act is
created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the
principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the
principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act
for him." Perkins v. Willacy, 431 P.2d 141, 142 (Alaska 1967) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958)). Accord Bruton v. Automatic Welding &
Supply Corp., 513 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Alaska 1973).
Apparent authority shifts the burden of the unauthorized transaction on the basis
of relative fault. For this reason, the appearance that the agent had sufficient real
authority must be traced to the acts or omissions of the negligent principal. It cannot
arise from the statements, acts, or representations of the faithless agent. In establish-
ing the fault of the principal, the third party must also prove more than a subjective
good faith belief in the real authority of the agent. In Alaska, such belief must also be
proven to have been "reasonable."
The ACC does not define the standard of inquiry or care attributed to the reason-
able person. The official comment to section .025 declares an intent to "embrace cases
demanding proof that a reasonable person, situated as was the third party and exercis-
ing reasonable prudence in evaluating not only the indications of the principal's con-
sent but also those which would warn of lack of authority, would have formed a belief
as to the real authority of the agent." H. & S. JT. JOURNAL Supp., No. 9, at 17 (May
15, 1987). Such a standard is in accord with the one adopted by the Alaska Supreme
Court in City of Delta Junction v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 670 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1983).
The court adopted the following formulation: "'Apparent authority may ... arise
because the agent has been placed in such a position that a person of ordinary pru-
dence, who was conversant with the nature of the particular business and its usages,
would be justified in believing that the agent was authorized.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting
W. SELL, AGENCY § 35, at 26 (1975)).
34. For an excellent definition and application of the doctrine of ratification by a




The ACC expressly extends its policy on both ultra vires transac-
tions and unauthorized contracts and conveyances to foreign corpora-
tions doing business or having property situated in Alaska.35
B. Formation of Corporations
Article 3 contains important statutory innovations concerning the
corporate articles, and a very specific policy upon the commencement
of corporate existence which will directly determine the liability of
those who engage in transactions in the name of a non-existent corpo-
rate entity. Another important provision sets up the default rights of
both the directors and shareholders to adopt, amend or repeal provi-
sions of the corporate bylaws.
1. Defective Formation and Pre-incorporation Transactions. For
decades courts have been vexed by litigation occasioned by defective
corporate formation. The cases fall into two broad categories. The
first deals with persons who transact business with third parties in the
name of a corporation which they believe to have been formed but
which, under applicable law, has yet to achieve a corporate exist-
ence.36 The second involves the contract dealings of corporate pro-
moters who, prior to corporate formation, consciously act to contract
for the benefit of the after-arising entity.37
35. ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.015(c), .025(b) (1989).
36. To illustrate the confusion, in 1964 the high courts of adjacent jurisdictions
decided nearly identical fact patterns construing functionally identical provisions of
the then Model Act, and yet reached opposite results.
Cranson v. IBM, 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964), reversed a judgment obtained
by a creditor against an individual who sought to form and thereafter occupy the
position of president of Real Estate Service Bureau, Inc. Unknown to Cranson on the
day he contracted in the name of the corporation to purchase office equipment, his
attorney had failed to file the articles of incorporation. Notwithstanding that fact, the
court of appeals held that the expectations of the third party seller had sought nothing
more than corporate liability. Despite the total absence of evidence that the seller had
contracted with knowledge that the articles had not been filed, the court held IBM
estopped to deny the corporate existence of Real Estate Service Bureau. At approxi-
mately the same time, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia held an enter-
priser personally liable under a fact pattern one would have thought more likely to
attract judicial sympathy. Levy had filed corporate articles six days before he sought
to contract signing himself as "president" of his new corporation. Unfortunately, the
articles were returned by the District authorities who had discovered irregularity in
their content. The court concluded that sections 50 and 139 of the Model Act had
abolished the doctrines of de facto incorporation and corporation by estoppel. Rob-
ertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C. 1964).
37. Such transactions involve at least three extraordinary elements of risk: (1)
that the contemplated corporation will not be formed; (2) that though technically
formed it will be still-born never functioning as a business entity; and (3) that though
formed and functional it will decline to adopt the pre-formation contract. The classic
case is O'Rorke v. Geary. 207 Pa. 240, 56 A. 541 (1903). A more modern version of
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As of the effective date of the ACC such questions will no longer
trouble the citizens or judiciary of Alaska. On and after July 1, 1989,
corporate existence begins with the issuance by the commissioner of
the certificate of incorporation. This bright line event is critical, for
section .218 expressly abolishes the doctrines of de jure compliance, de
facto corporations, and corporations by estoppel.38
the fact pattern, in which the court was strongly influenced by section 326 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, may be found in Stanley J. How & Associates v.
Boss. 222 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Iowa 1963).
38. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.218 (1989). The bright line event in section .218 con-
tinues the basic policy of former Alaska Statutes section 10.05.261 which had been
predicated upon section 56 of the former Model Act. Under the ACC, the filing of
corporate articles is accomplished by delivery of an original and exact copy to the
commissioner for processing under section .910. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.213 (1989).
A certificate is not immediately issued, but follows upon an administrative determina-
tion that the articles are in compliance with statutory requirements.
At about the same time that the Alaska Code Revision Commission was conclud-
ing that all doctrines short of crossing the bright line of formation should be abol-
ished, the framers of the RMBCA were recommending provisions designed to exceed
their laxity. Under RMBCA section 2.03(a), corporate existence begins when the arti-
cles are filed. There is no specific provision dealing with rejection for statutory irregu-
larity. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 2.03(a) (1984). However, section 2.04
appears to assert that persons who act as or on behalf of a corporation which does not
exist will be exposed to personal liability only if they "know" of the failure to obtain
incorporation. Id. § 2.04. The official comment justifies this position by asserting that
"[a]nalogous protection has long been accorded under the uniform limited partnership
acts to limited partners who contribute capital to a partnership in the erroneous belief
that a limited partnership certificate has been filed." Id. § 2.04 Official Comment (cit-
ing UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 12 (1916); REv. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 304 (1976)).
There are both conceptual and technical problems with this statement. First, the
author must have been contemplating section 11 of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act and not section 12. Section 11 of the 1916 Uniform Act and section 304 of the
Revised Act both deal with the status of persons who erroneously believe themselves
to be limited partners. Under the 1916 Uniform Act such a person can become a
general partner only by promptly renouncing her interest in the profits of the business.
UNiF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 11 (1916); see Vidricksen v. Grover, 363 F.2d 372
(9th Cir. 1966). Under the Revised Act the ersatz limited partner is not a general
partner if, on ascertaining the mistake, he either causes the appropriate certificate to
be filed or withdraws from future equity participation in the enterprise. No emphasis
is placed on the necessity of taking either step "promptly." REV. UNIF. LTD. PART-
NERSHIP AT § 304(a) (1976). However, in the meantime there is liability as a general
partner to any third party who enters a transaction with the firm in the belief that the
investor is a general partner. Id. § 304(b).
Second, the author of the comment is simply wrong in leaving an impression that
persons who fail to file a certificate of limited partnership are spared the pains of
general partner liability. Recent judicial decisions are split. Dwinell's Central Neon
v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel imposed the liability of general partners on all
investors:
Limited partnerships were unknown at common law and are purely crea-
tures of statute. Parties seeking the protection of limited liability within the
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Section .220(a) completes coverage of both defective and pre-for-
mation transactions by fixing joint and several liability upon persons
who presume to act as a corporation for which there has been no issu-
ance of a certificate of incorporation. Consistent with the desire to
give individuals the greatest freedom to bargain over risk, section
.220(b) declares that the terms of a written contract between a third
party and an individual purporting to act on behalf of a non-existent
corporation may modify or preclude the liability created by subsection
(a). 39 Together, sections .218 and .220 remove the doubt and occasion
for litigation implicit in hinging corporate liability privileges upon ar-
guments over good faith formation efforts or the expectations of third
parties.
2. The Articles of Incorporation. The mandatory content of the
articles of any corporation formed under the ACC are detailed in sec-
tion .208. The enunciated goal of the new code is to require that fun-
damental decisions concerning the purpose for which the entity is
formed, its stated duration, and the number and types of shares into
which the ownership claims will be divided be set forth in the articles.
The policy protects both prospective and existing shareholders. A po-
tential shareholder need inspect only one document to gain knowledge
context of a partnership must follow the statutory requirements. To form a
limited partnership, a certificate of limited partnership must be drafted and
filed with the county clerk .... While our courts no longer require literal
compliance with the statute at one's peril, the statute does contemplate at
least "substantial compliance with the requirements." Here, there was no
compliance with the statute at the time of contracting and the certificate of
limited partnership was not filed until several months later.
21 Wash. App. 929, 934, 587 P.2d 191, 194 (Ct. App. 1978) (citations omitted). The
court concluded that creditors had a right to rely upon statutory compliance. For that
reason, the third party's knowledge concerning the status of a limited partnership was
irrelevant. Id. at 935-36, 587 P.2d at 195. Precisely the opposite conclusion was
reached in Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Finally, even in those cases in which the ersatz limited partners are given contin-
ued protection from general partner liability, there must be at least one general part-
ner who faces the claims of third party creditors with a total exposure of personal
assets. In the instance of defective corporate formation, permitting the enterprisers to
escape personal liability if they did not subjectively know that their corporation had
not been formed permits them to shift all loss to totally innocent third party creditors.
This result simply cannot obtain in the case of a defectively-formed limited
partnership.
39. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.220 (1989). However, an oral promise, agreement, or
understanding is declared incompetent to preclude or modify the personal liability of
persons who assume to act as or for a corporation for which no certificate has been
issued. Id. at § 10.06.220(c).
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of the basic information needed to evaluate an investment decision. 40
Once shares are outstanding the relative difficulty encountered in at-
tempts to amend or repeal provisions of the articles assures a degree of
stability with respect to these basic predicates.
The significant innovation concerning the articles of incorpora-
tion is found in section .210, which contains a lengthy list of basic
corporate decisions which can only be governed by provisions in the
articles.41 Any attempt to regulate an included subject in the bylaws,
board resolution, or shareholder agreement is totally ineffective. 42
Again, the goal of the new code is to make the articles the single repos-
itory of fundamental decisions which shape the corporate governance
structure as well as the rights and liabilities of shareholders. An indi-
vidual contemplating corporate formation under the ACC will find in
section .210(1) an occasion to ponder the following issues:
Sec. 10.06.210. Articles of incorporation; optional provisions.
The articles of incorporation may set out
(1) any of the following provisions, that are not effective unless
expressly provided in the articles:
(A) a provision granting, with or without limitations,
the power to levy assessments upon the shares or class of
shares;
(B) a provision removing from shareholders preemptive
rights to subscribe to any or all issues of shares or
securities;
(C) special qualifications of persons who may be
shareholders;
(D) a provision limiting the duration of the corpora-
tion's existence to a specified date;
(E) a provision restricting or eliminating the power of
the board or of the outstanding shares to adopt, amend, or
repeal provisions of the bylaws as provided in [Alaska
Statutes section] 10.06.228;(F) a provision requiring, for any corporate action ex-
cept as provided in [Alaska Statutes section] 10.06.460
and [Alaska Statutes section] 10.06.605, the vote of a
larger proportion or of all of the shares of a class or series,
or the vote or quorum for taking action of a larger propor-
tion or of all of the directors, than is otherwise required by
this chapter;
(G) a provision limiting or restricting the business in
which the corporation may engage or the powers that the
corporation may exercise or both;
40. Note that unlike former Alaska Statutes section 10.05.225 the new code omits
all reference to "par value." The concept has been eliminated with reference to corpo-
rate financial accounting. A statement of par value may still be set forth in the articles
but it will no longer determine the accounting treatment given to investor funds.
41. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210 (1989).
42. Id.
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(H) a provision conferring upon the holder of an evi-
dence of indebtedness, issued or to be issued by the corpo-
ration, the right to vote in the election of directors and on
any other matters on which shareholders may vote;
(I) a provision conferring on shareholders the right to
determine the consideration for which shares shall be
issued;
(J) a provision requiring the approval of the sharehold-
ers or the approval of the outstanding shares for a corpo-
rate action, even though not otherwise required by this
chapter;
(K) a provision that one or more classes or series of
shares are redeemable as provided in [Alaska Statutes sec-
tion] 10.06.325;
(L) [Repealed 1989.]; 43
() a provision that confers or imposes the powers, du-
ties, privileges, and liabilities of directors upon delegates
under [Alaska Statutes section] 10.06.450;
(N) a provision eliminating or limiting the personal lia-
bility of a director to the corporation or its stockholders
[shareholders] for monetary damages for the breach of fi-
duciary duty as a director; the articles of incorporation
may not eliminate or limit the liability of a director for (i)
a breach of a director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders [shareholders]; (ii) acts or omissions
not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct or
a knowing violation of law; (iii) wilful or negligent con-
duct involved in the payment of dividends or the repur-
chase of stock from other than lawfully available funds; or
(iv) a transaction from which the director derives an im-
proper personal benefit; the provisions of this paragraph
do not eliminate or limit the liability of a director for an
act or omission that occurs before the effective date of the
articles of incorporation or of an amendment to the arti-
cles of incorporation authorized by this paragraph .... 44
43. 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 82, § 59. The 1989 amendments repealed the
original content of section .210(1)(L) so as to conform to the amended content of
Alaska Statutes section 10.06.433(a). As a result, corporations with fewer than 100
shareholders of record are relieved of the obligation to prepare and distribute an an-
nual report. This exemption may be waived and an obligation to prepare such a re-
port may be imposed by a provision of the articles or bylaws. ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.433(a) (1989).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1) (1989). The mandatory provisions of section
.210 will initially apply to corporations formed on and after the effective date of the
ACC. Existing corporations, formed under the former Alaska Business Corporation
Act, are given a five year grace period until July 1, 1994, before they must bring their
articles into full compliance with sections .208 and .210. In the meantime they are
free to amend their articles to bring them into compliance with the provisions of the
new code. 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 166, § 9.
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A careful examination of these optional provisions is the simplest way
of learning the major default norms which govern a corporation in the
absence of the specific provisions in its articles.45
3. Bylaws. If the articles are analogous to the constitutional
framework of a corporate entity, the bylaws provide the statutory
structure regulating the board and the relationship between manage-
ment and the shareholders. Viewed from this perspective, it is evident
that few powers are more important than the right to adopt, amend or
45. Section .210(1)(A) protects the expectation of a purchaser of shares that once
the purchase price has been paid in full there is no further liability by way of financial
assessments. Cases such as Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mut. Water Co., 58 Cal. App.
2d 709, 714, 137 P.2d 757, 760 (1943), holding a purchaser of stock in a water corpo-
ration to be charged with knowledge of the inherent assessability of his shares, are
reversed. Under section .210(1)(A) the articles must affirmatively permit assessability
for the power to exist.
Section .210(l)(B) continues former Alaska Statutes section 10.05.255(8), which
required that preemptive rights obtain unless explicitly removed by a provision in the
articles. See also ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.428 (1989).
Section .210(l)(C) establishes that, absent an express provision in the articles,
corporations may not create special qualifications for persons who may be sharehold-
ers.
Section .210(1)(D) requires that, absent an express limitation on the duration of
the corporation being set forth in the articles, the corporation is to endure until dis-
solved pursuant to the ACC.
Section .210(l)(E) requires that if there is to be restriction or elimination of the
concurrent, independent power of the board and the outstanding shares to adopt,
amend, or repeal bylaws such provision must be made in the articles.
Simple majority voting requirements at the board level are the norm under the
ACC. Shareholder voting requirements default to specific provisions which require
either approval of the shareholders or approval of the outstanding shares. In the case
of the former, approval is gained by a simple majority of the shares voting at a meeting
at which a quorum is present. ALASKA STAT. § 10.08.990(6) (1989). Approval of the
outstanding shares is more difficult, requiring an absolute majority of the outstanding
shares. Id. § 10.06.990(5) (1989). If supermajority or even unanimous voting require-
ments are to be imposed at the board or shareholder level, they must be expressly
created by provision in the articles. Id. § 10.06.210(l)(F) (1989).
In the absence of aptly defined limitations upon the business which the corpora-
tion may pursue, the extent and nature of corporate business activities rest within the
business judgment of the board. Activities beyond any express limitations would be
ultra vires to the corporation. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Absent an express provision in the articles, holders of corporate debt instruments
do not have voting rights with respect to the election of directors or other matters
committed by the ACC to shareholder decision. Provisions of the articles are compe-
tent to extend such voting rights. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(H) (1989).
Section .210(1)(I) furthers the policy of section .335 in recognizing that absent an
express provision in the articles, the board, and not the shareholders, shall determine
the consideration to be received for the issuance of shares.
Section .210(1)(J) reflects the policy of section .450(a) which vests control and
management of the corporation in the board of directors. However, by the terms of an
express provision in the articles, any corporate action may be subjected to a prior
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repeal bylaw provisions. Under the former Alaska Business Corpora-
tion Act, such power was vested exclusively in the board unless re-
served to the shareholders in the articles of incorporation. 46 Under
the new code the shareholders have coequal power with the board.
The norm is not mandatory, and section .228 expressly recognizes that
the articles are competent to restrict or eliminate the power of either
the board or the outstanding shares.47 Individuals drafting corporate
articles have three options: (1) concurrent, independent power in the
board and the outstanding shares (the default rule); (2) an article pro-
vision restricting or eliminating the power of the outstanding shares;
or (3) an article provision restricting or eliminating the power of the
board.48
Under the terms of section .228 if the shareholders are to act with
respect to the content of the bylaws they must achieve an absolute
majority of the shares voting in favor of the proposed change.
Former Alaska law required that the number of directors be es-
tablished in the initial articles.49 Such an arrangement remains possi-
ble but is no longer mandatory under the new code. The relative
requirement that it receive the approval of the shareholders, see id. § 10.06.990(6)
(1989), or the approval of the outstanding shares. See id. § 10.06.990(5) (1989).
Absent an affirmative provision under section .210(1)(K), a corporation is with-
out power to redeem its shares as provided in section .325.
Section .210(1)(L) requires that any delegation of board powers, duties, or privi-
leges to delegates, as permitted by section .450, be set forth in an explicit provision in
the articles.
Directors of corporations formed or operated under provisions of the ACC are
disciplined by fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Section .210(1)(N) permits a corpo-
ration to adopt an article provision which would eliminate or limit the liability of a
director for breach of the duty of care but not of loyalty. Note that such a provision is
not competent to limit the liability of a director who consents to an unauthorized
distribution of corporate assets or who has received any improper personal benefit.
46. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.135 (1957) (repealed 1988).
47. Under the terms of section .210(1)(F) only an optional provision of the arti-
cles may alter the default norm established in section .228.
48. During the five year grace period which expires on July 1, 1994, corporations
formed under the former Alaska Business Corporation Act may continue to observe
the machinery and procedures for adopting, amending and repealing bylaws. On July
1, 1994, if the corporation has not amended its articles to restrict or eliminate the
powers conferred by section .228, the shareholders will automatically retain concur-
rent, independent power over the content of the bylaws. 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
166, § 9(b).
49. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.177(a) (1957) (repealed 1988). Though fixed initially
in the articles, the number of directors could be increased or decreased by amending
the bylaws. When one recalls that the default arrangement under the former Act
placed the power of amending the articles within the exclusive province of the board,
the potential for manipulation was frightening. Under the new code, if the number of
directors is fixed in the articles it may only be changed by amending the articles.
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stability of an article provision may be attained by the simple expedi-
ent of fixing the number of directors in an optional provision of the
articles under section .210(4) of the new code. If such a step is not
taken, section .230 mandates that the bylaws state the number of di-
rectors or state that the number of directors may be fixed within a
specified minimum and maximum, by approval of the board or the
shareholders.50
Amendments adopted in 1989, prior to the effective date of the
ACC, eliminated the original content of section .230(a) which required
a minimum of three directors unless the corporation had fewer than
three shareholders, in which case the number of directors did not have
to exceed the number of shareholders. As currently amended, the
number of directors may be fixed at one irrespective of the number of
shareholders.5 1
C. Corporate Finance
Article 4 of the new code collects the statutory provisions relating
to the creation of equitable interests in the corporation and the cir-
cumstances under which the board has discretion to make a distribu-
tion of corporate assets to those equitable owners.52 As amended
during the pre-effective period, the ACC makes available potentially
significant innovations respecting the use of electronic data-keeping by
the corporation, abolishing the need for physical share certificates and
facilitating communication between the corporate issuer and the bene-
ficial owner of shares held "in street name." Although these provi-
sions are useful, the significant law reform lies in the abolition of legal
accounting concepts and the substitution of easily understood and ap-
plied tests for determining the circumstances under which the board
has discretion to distribute corporate assets.
1. Creation and Regulation of Equitable Interests.
a. The creation of senior shares. The ACC substantially reenacts
the provisions of the former act which granted a corporate issuer great
50. If the articles or bylaws establish a formula under which the board may set
the number of directors, this power must be exercised by a majority of the entire board
and may not be used to shorten the term of any incumbent director. ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.453(b) (1989).
51. 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 82, §§ 5, 59. The amendment follows the content
of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act section 8.03(a). Corporate articles or
bylaws which pursue this latitude do so at the expense of any possible minority repre-
sentation of the corporate board.
52. Article 4 governs the distribution of corporate assets to beneficial owners dur-
ing the life of the entity. The issues of residual claims to such assets in the event of a
cessation of corporate existence are addressed in Article 9, Dissolution.
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flexibility in designing its financial structure.5 3 Subject only to the im-
plicit requirement that there be one class of common shares which has
full voting and redemption rights, Alaska corporations are free to cre-
ate classes of senior shares or series within the same class.54
b. Corporate option to redeem one or more classes or series of senior
shares. Prior to the effective date of the ACC, Alaska had no statu-
tory law governing the redemption of shares by the corporate issuer.
The matter is now given comprehensive treatment in section .325.
Two limitations must be initially observed. A corporation has no right
to acquire, through purchase or otherwise, its common shares once
they have become outstanding in the hands of investors. Thus, re-
demption rights exist only for "senior shares." Under section .325(a)
not even that right exists absent an affirmative provision in the articles
of incorporation. 55
Unless the corporation is an open-ended investment company
registered under the United States Investment Company Act of
1940,56 section .325(b) flatly prohibits the issuance of any class or se-
ries of shares which purports to grant redemption at the option of the
shareholder.
Assuming an apt provision in the corporate articles, section
.325(c) recognizes the right of the corporate issuer to bargain with the
holders of senior shares over the issue of redemption "to the extent
53. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.305 (1989) (creation, classes, and issuance of shares);
id. § 10.06.308 (issuance of preferred or special classes of shares); id. § 10.06.3 10 (issu-
ance of shares in series); id. § 10.06.315 (series rights and preferences established by
the board); id. § 10.06.318 (manner of establishing series).
Note that section .305(a) contains an important procedural restriction. Before a
corporation may issue more than one class of shares or divide that class into a series,
the articles must either state the basic attributes of the classes or series or expressly
delegate the determination of such rights and preferences to the board. Section
.305(b) adds a further substantive limitation that all shares of the same class or of the
same series shall have identical rights, privileges, and restrictions. The formulation of
these statutory restrictions is adapted from the California General Corporation Law,
but they work no substantive change over former sections 10.05.060 and 10.05.069 of
the Alaska Statutes.
54. As detailed in section .308, preferred or special classes of shares are distin-
guished from the residual common stock by any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) being subject to a right of redemption by the corporate issuer; (2) entitling the
holders to a dividend preference which may be cumulative, noncumulative, or par-
tially cumulative; (3) having a liquidation preference in the distribution of net corpo-
rate assets in the wake of either voluntary or involuntary corporate dissolution; or (4)
being convertible into shares of another class or series with junior claims upon divi-
dends or liquidation.
55. Under section .210(l)(K) a provision that one or more classes or series of
shares are redeemable is totally ineffective unless expressed in the optional content of
the articles.
56. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1989).
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permitted by this chapter."'57 This limiting phrase is important, for
under the new code the repurchase of its own senior securities is
treated as a distribution of corporate assets subject to the limitations
set forth in sections .358-.383.58
c. Stock rights and options. Prior to July 1, 1989, the legal capac-
ity of an Alaska corporation to issue stock rights or options was un-
clear. The former act was totally silent, and the topic had not been
squarely addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court.59 Members of the
Code Revision Commission deemed this a serious omission given the
utility of both rights and options as a source of corporate capital in
general, and in creating deferred compensation schemes for corporate
employees.
Unless prohibited or restricted in the articles of incorporation,
section .343 grants a corporation, acting through its board, broad
powers to create and issue rights or options covering any class or series
of authorized but unissued stock. The only substantive command is
that if such rights or options are to be made available to directors,
officers, or employees of the corporation or any subsidiary, and not to
the shareholders generally, their issuance must have been approved by
57. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.325(c) (1989).
58. The official comment to section .325 asserts a legislative intention to invoke
another set of protective restraints:
[I]t is the intention of the legislature to subject the decision to redeem or
repurchase shares to the duties of care and loyalty otherwise imposed upon
directors and corporate officers. Such concepts have been clearly recognized
by the Supreme Court of Alaska as impacting upon those who de jure or de
facto exercise the powers of corporate management. See Wolf v. Arctic
Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 770 (Alaska 1977).
Granting full recognition to such fiduciary duties does not support the
conclusion that either redemption or repurchase must, in all circumstances,
be employed on a pro rata basis to all shares of the class or series. Cases
such as General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N.J. Eq. 326,
331, 129 A. 244, 246 (1925), to the extent that they would establish such an
absolute proposition, are disapproved.
If those vested with the powers of corporate management can establish
a valid business purpose for the entry into an agreement to redeem or repur-
chase some but not all of the shares of a given class or series those who are
not extended the terms of such a transaction have no complaint. See Martin
v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 244, 92 A.2d 295, 301
(1952).
H. & S. JT. JOURNAL Supp., No. 9,-at 45-46 (May 15, 1987).
59. On at least three occasions the court has made footnote reference to stock
options. In none of these cases were options at issue, and the inclusion of the language
could not be relied upon as judicial recognition that an inherit right to issue them was
being proclaimed. Stevens ex rel. Park View Corp. v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389, 392
n.3 (Alaska 1988); Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 651 n.2 (Alaska 1987); Alaska Plas-
tics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 275 n.7 (Alaska 1980).
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an affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the outstanding shares or
consistent with a plan so approved or ratified.60
d. Shares without certificates. Section .349, included within the
package of pre-effective date amendments, affords both existing and
newly formed corporate issuers an option to issue some or all of the
entity's shares without certificates. 61 Such power exists and is exer-
cised within the discretion of the board unless extinguished or re-
stricted by a. provision in the articles or corporate bylaws. If shares
are issued without certificates, section .349(b) directs that a written
notice be used to impart the information regarding rights, privileges
and limitations or the notice of a shareholder agreement. Such infor-
mation is normally disclosed by compliance with the ACC require-
ments for notice or statement on the share certificate.62
e. Shares held by nominees. Another influence of the RMBCA is
found in section .356, which establishes a corporate option to set up
machinery for communication with the beneficial owner of shares held
in "street name" by a nominee.6 3 While under no obligation to inau-
gurate such procedures, the affirmative corporate decision may be re-
flected in provisions of the articles, bylaws or board resolution.
2. Distributions to Shareholders. Few aspects of the law reform
effort proved of more active interest to members of the Commission
than devising a workable statutory scheme to regulate distributions of
corporate assets to holders of common stock. Recognizing that the
directors owe their election and continuation in office to the holders of
the common stock, the goal was to balance the legitimate desire of
management for flexibility against the needs of corporate creditors and
the holders of shares with either a dividend or liquidation preference.
Both groups are threatened by such a distribution and are almost cer-
tain to be without representation on the board.64 Repeatedly, the
60. Unless preemptive rights have been eliminated or curtailed by an optional
provision of the corporate articles, section .210(l)(B), the decision by the board to
create rights or options in unissued stock would be subject to the preemptive rights of
existing shareholders. If the offering is restricted to directors, officers or employees of
the corporation pursuant to a shareholder approved plan, there are no preemptive
rights. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.428(b)(1)(A) (1989).
61. 1989 Adaska Sess. Laws ch. 82, § 8. Section .349 is premised on RMBCA
section 6.26. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 6.26 (1984).
62. ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.06.350, .424 (1989).
63. RMBCA section 7.23 served as the basis for Alaska Statutes section
10.06.356. It was added to the ACC by section 11 of chapter 82 of the Alaska Session
Laws of 1989.
64. The inherently opposed postures of creditors and equitable owners, as well as




Commissioners insisted that for any reform to succeed the new legisla-
tion would have to be easy for a businessperson to comprehend and
straightforward to apply. If those goals were achieved, a derivative
advantage to both the courts and the populace would be easy detection
and proof of violations.
a. An historical perspective. In late 1979, the Commission di-
rected that the results of a survey of existing caselaw and statutory
approaches be summarized. The historical overview which I prepared
In the usual case... it will be a matter of major concern to the creditor of
the corporation to seek four objectives - precisely as in the case of the
lender to hn individual debtor.
(1) The creditor will be happier if his corporate debtor has substantial
assets in the corporate till at the time he extends credit and thereafter;
(2) The creditor will want to prevent the corporation from incurring
debts to other general creditors with whom he may have to share the corpo-
ration's limited assets;
(3) The creditor will want the corporate assets to remain free and
unencumbered of any lien interests by a prior (secured) creditor; and
(4) The creditor will want to preserve a cushion of protective assets,
and will want to see to it that no claimants who rank junior to him (usually
shareholders, but sometimes subordinated debt holders) make off with assets
of the corporation while the creditor's claim is still outstanding and unpaid.
The ideal world as conceived by the creditor of the corporation is a
world that is normally wholly unacceptable to the shareholder. The investor
who buys shares of stock in the incorporated enterprise and the investor who
lends money to the incorporated enterprise are, as a matter of economics,
engaged in the same kind of activity and are motivated by the same basic
objectives. They are both making a capital investment; they both expect or
hope to get their money back in the long run, either by liquidating pay-out
or by sale of the security; and they both expect and hope to receive income
from their investment in the interim before their capital is returned to them
in full. In the stereotypic model transaction, the investor, who chose to take
a shareholder's position rather than a creditor's position in a particular
transaction, simply made a calculated economic judgment that he could
make more money by relinquishing to creditor investors a "prior" claim for
interest and a fixed principal payment on maturity, and, by opting for uncer-
tain "dividends" and the residual claim to the assets of the enterprise that
would remain after all creditors, with their fixed claims, had been paid off.
The shareholder's willingness to admit the "priority" of the creditor's inter-
est claim and claim for principal payment on maturity, does not imply, how-
ever, that the shareholder is willing to stand by chronologically until such
time as the creditors have been paid in full. The shareholder will insist, in
general, that if, as he hopes, thd enterprise makes money (and perhaps even
if it does not), the shareholders will receive some return on (or of) their
investment from time to time, regardless of the fact that there are creditor
claims outstanding. Such periodic payments to shareholders are character-
ized as "dividends"; and, in the usual and normal case of the healthy incor-
porated enterprise, it is assumed that some assets will be regularly paid out
from the corporate treasury to the shareholder investors in dividend form.




has subsequently been incorporated by the legislature as a general sec-
tion of its official comments to sections .358-.383 of the ACC.65
Prior law, whether statutory or judge-made, has proven
less than a match for directors bent upon dissipation of cor-
porate assets. The initial position was that a distribution of
assets which rendered the corporation bankrupt was a fraud
upon the rights of creditors. Since this test was applied only
after the fact, it had little value as a deterrent.
In the 1870's there emerged a refinement of the insol-
vency test. It was recognized that the assets of a corporation
should be divided into two categories: fixed assets for which
there was no ready ability of the market to convert them into
cash; and "liquid or current assets" which could easily be
exchanged for money. The dissipation of assets in the form
of dividends directly drew down the cash reserves of the cor-
poration. In so doing, it threatened to leave the corporation
unable to meet its current liabilities in the normal course of
business.
A corporation which could not pay its debts as they be-
came due was "equitably insolvent" and a faithless debtor.
Creditors were forced to either postpone repayment or force
the corporate debtor into bankruptcy. It was a no win situa-
tion viewed from the perspective of the public interest: dis-
appointed creditors might default upon their own
obligations; bankruptcy of the entity produced unemploy-
ment and eliminated a competitor from the marketplace.
New York was among the first jurisdictions to build a
statutory scheme beyond the insolvency test. Still in use in
that jurisdiction, it has come to be known as the "Balance
Sheet Surplus Test." This legislation forbade a distribution
to shareholders unless the assets of the corporation exceeded
its liabilities to all third parties and an amount attributable
to "stated capital." When the balance sheet test was first
promulgated, it sought security for creditors by taking ad-
vantage of a popular custom to issue corporate stock with a
high "par value."
Par value was a tricky concept at best. Many investors
showed a preference for high par value on the theory that it
65. For a more thoroughly researched presentation of the historical evolution of
restraints upon the distribution of corporate assets in decisional, charter and statutory
law, see Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359-63 (1957) (collecting authorities). Hackney concludes that
credit for devising the balance sheet surplus test belongs to Ohio and the 1927 revision
of its General Corporation Act. Id. at 1360-61.
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somehow reflected an intrinsic worth for the new issue.
What it in fact did was play into the hands of the New York
legislation. "Stated capital" was an accounting entry equal
to that fraction of the total sum of the monies received by the
corporate issuer amounting to the "par value" of the shares.
If the corporation sold the shares for a price above the "par
value" such additional consideration was carried on the
books as "paid-in surplus" (referred to as "capital surplus"
in other jurisdictions following essentially the same legisla-
tive scheme).
The board of directors was free to declare and pay divi-
dends out of assets attributable to paid-in surplus, but they
could licitly go no further. The net effect of the balance
sheet surplus test was to create a cushion for creditors and
holders of senior securities. Their protection was founded in
the command that the assets of the corporation could not be
drawn down to the point where they were no longer equal to
total liabilities and stated capital.
No sooner was this statute in place than ways were de-
vised to minimize, if not mock, its effectiveness. The Great
Depression inadvertently helped by disabusing the public of
the notion that there was much to the concept of "par
value." Gilt-edged certificates with a par value of $1,000
were used to paper not a few bathrooms. In the post-World
War II expansion of the economy, the public showed a will-
ingness to purchase low or nominal par stock. The impact of
this appetite created a remarkably thin cushion in the form
of a stated capital account.
In the 1950's, "no par" stock gained acceptance. The
New York legislation was adjusted so that the board was
given power to allocate the consideration received for no par
shares between stated capital and paid-in surplus accounts.
Such license permitted the board to make only a nominal
attribution to state[d] capital, reducing the protection af-
forded creditors to de minimis dimensions.
By the time no par stock had come on the scene, many
critics were calling for replacement of the balance sheet sur-
plus test with a more meaningful statutory scheme. The re-
sult was the creation of the "Earned Surplus Test." Illinois
was one of the first jurisdictions to adopt this approach and
the Model Act, expanding upon the Illinois scheme, spread
the new test. The gist of the new test was the belief that the
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board should have an unfettered discretion to distribute as-
sets to common shareholders only so long as such assets
were taken from the net corporate earnings.
Thus the assets realized from the sale of stock were not
to be distributed to shareholders because such a move was
correctly perceived as a partial liquidation - a return of as
opposed to on shareholders' investments. In its most vigor-
ous form, the earned surplus test would have denied the
board discretion to pay a dividend unless corporate assets
exceeded total liabilities to third parties and a further sum
equal to the total consideration for the sale of shares.
If the earned surplus tests had been maintained without
exceptions it would have gone far beyond the balance sheet
surplus test in constructing a cushion for creditors and the
holders of senior securities. Instead, the test has been rid-
dled with exceptions.
Under Section 46 of the MBCA, a corporation was per-
mitted to make a distribution of assets notwithstanding the
fact that there were no net earnings during the accounting
period. Such a distribution could be charged against capital
surplus (funds attributable to the sale of shares) if the hold-
ers of a. majority of the outstanding shares affirmatively
voted for the distribution; or, if the articles" contained a pro-
vision empowering the board to make distributions charge-
able against capital surplus. If there was an outstanding
class of preferred (senior) shares there could be no distribu-
tion chargeable to capital surplus without first having paid
all accrued preferential dividends. This limitation func-
tioned to protect the interests of senior securities while leav-
ing creditors helpless to protest unless the distribution from
capital surplus threatened equitable insolvency.
A further exception proved useful if the corporation had
experienced a net operating loss. One might suppose that
such a loss would have to be made up in future years before
the board could gain the discretion to pay further dividends.
The Model Act was more generous. Under Section 70, the
board was able to meet this adversity by simply passing a
resolution to apply any part or all of its capital surplus to the
reduction or elimination of the deficit arising from such a
loss. If in the succeeding accounting period there were net
profits, dividends could be paid out of this "earned surplus."
There was no requirement that the capital surplus account
ever be restored to its original dimension. A return of capital
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had been accomplished and the creditor's cushion reduced
for all times.
If business reverses were so severe that operating losses
reduced assets below the total of liabilities plus stated capi-
tal, the board was without power to pay a dividend unless,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Model Act, the shareholders
were to concur in the generation of a "reduction surplus."
The essence of this scheme was a permanent reduction in
stated capital. The "surplus" so generated would become
"capital surplus" and available for distribution as such.
The only limitation was a command that stated capital
could not be reduced to an amount less than the aggregate
amounts payable to all shares having preferential right in the
assets of the corporation in the event of involuntary liquida-
tion, plus the aggregate par value of all issued shares having
no such preferential rights. When it is recalled that par
value of such shares was likely to be nominal it can be seen
that the interests of creditors were protected by little more
than the insolvency prohibition.
If the board was unable to gain the concurrence of the
shareholders (including the voting by class of any holders of
senior securities) in the creation of a reduction surplus, it
was forced to enter the succeeding accounting period with
"impaired stated capital." There would be no further licit
dividends until future net earnings increased the assets of the
corporation to the point at which they again exceeded total
liabilities plus stated capital. Directors in such circum-
stances were likely candidates for defeat in the next election
by disappointed shareholders.
The latest step in relaxing the earned surplus test was
the creation of a concept aptly termed "nimble dividends."
For the directors of a corporation with impaired stated capi-
tal it came as manna from heaven. Under an optional ver-
sion of Section 45 of the Model Act, if a corporation has net
earnings for two consecutive fiscal years, then, notwithstand-
ing a continued impairment of stated capital, a dividend
could be declared by the board and charged against the cur-
rent net earnings.
While a rationale may be offered in support of each of
these exceptions, their net effect upon the earned surplus test
has been characterized by critics as the creation of a watch
dog with no bite and little bark.66
66. H. & S. JT. JOURNAL Supp., No. 9, at 54-58 (May 15, 1987).
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b. The Alaska Business Corporation Act. The "financials" of the
new Alaska Corporations Code can best be understood against the
background of the attempted regulation under the Alaska Business
Corporation Act. Once the exception-ridden version of the earned
surplus test has been exposed, the reader can appreciate the competing
influences represented by the reform efforts undertaken in the Califor-
nia General Corporation Law and Revised Model Business Corpora-
tion Act.
Reflecting the influence of a generic mid-1950s version of the
Model Act and its specific Oregonian roots, the Alaska Business Cor-
poration Act suffered from virtually every loophole which riddled the
earned surplus test. The former Alaska Act began by imposing equita-
ble insolvency injunctions on the payment of dividends as well as the
redemption and repurchase of shares.67 Assuming that this test could
be met, dividends could be declared and paid in cash or property "only
out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the corpora-
tion, except as otherwise provided in this section."'68 Sadly, that state-
ment was very misleading. The very next section permitted the board
to declare and distribute cash or property to the holders of common
stock "in partial liquidation ... out of stated capital or capital sur-
plus. .... -"6 Section 46 of the Model Act authorized distributions
67. ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.05.201, .207, .012, .309 (1957) (repealed 1988). The lan-
guage of the former Act was less than ideal. In each of the above referenced sections,
the reader was told that the corporate distribution could not take place if the "corpo-
ration is insolvent, or when the [distribution] would render the corporation insolvent
... ." It would be possible to interpret this language as imposing merely an ultimate
or "bankruptcy" insolvency test. Under that reading if the total assets of the corpo-
rate entity equalled total liabilities following the distribution it would be licit though
the relationship of cash and other liquid assets to current liabilities would find the
corporation unable to meet its debts as they mature in the ordinary course of business.
68. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.204(1) (1957) (repealed 1988). The exceptions refer-
enced in section .204 were directed at wasting assets, at corporations which were gen-
erally exempt, and at the payment of stock dividends. No limitations were placed on
the board's discretion to declare and pay a dividend using previously issued and reac-
quired shares. If the stock was authorized but previously unissued, then a stock divi-
dend had to be reflected in an increase in the "stated capital" of the corporation by an
amount equal to the par value of the distributed shares. If the stock was without par
value, the directors were to fix a value attributable to stated capital. ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.05.204(4)(A)(B) (1957) (repealed 1988).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.207 (1957) (repealed 1988). From the vantage point
of investors who owned shares with dividend or distribution preferences, section .207
was not devoid of protective measures. Unless the articles contained a provision em-
powering the board to declare distributions in partial liquidation, the procedure was
dependent upon the prior authorization of an affirmative vote of two-thirds of each
outstanding class of stock. If the shares of a particular class or series did not have
voting rights, they were granted in this extraordinary situation by the statute. If divi-
dends for the holders of senior shares were in arrears, no dividend in partial liquida-
tion could be paid to junior shares until the shares entitled to the dividend preference
ALASKA CORPORATIONS CODE
from capital surplus, an account representing the receipt by the corpo-
ration of assets in exchange for the original issuance of shares which
exceeded the par value or board-determined stated capital attributed
to those shares.70 Permission to directly impair stated capital in the
course of a distribution to the holders of common stock appears to
have originated in Oregon. 7' Once accorded access to the stated capi-
tal account, the various strategies permitted by the Model Act to ap-
proach it by indirection would seem superfluous. Nevertheless, the
Alaska Business Corporation Act contained all but a nimble dividends
had been fully paid. Nor could a distribution be made that would so reduce the assets
of the corporation that, in the event of dissolution, the entity would be unable to meet
the liquidation preference of any class or series of shares. Finally, each distribution in
partial liquidation had to be identified to the recipient as a return of rather than on an
investment.
Useful as these measures might be in guarding the dividend and distribution pref-
erences of senior shares, one looked in vain for a protective concern for the interests of
corporate creditors.
70. MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 46 (1971).
71. OR. REv. STAT. § 57.221 (1953) (repealed 1987).
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feature.72 Capital surplus could be reduced so as to eliminate a deficit
arising from net business losses;73 so, too, could stated capital.74
From the vantage point of corporate creditors, the former Alaska
Business Corporation Act was merely more candid in reaching the re-
sult permitted under the amended Model Act. The cushion for credi-
tors secured under New York's original statutory balance sheet
surplus requirement, and the later earned surplus requirement, was
pragmatically reduced to an insecurity blanket. The use of low par
stock or no par stock, followed by a minimum allocation of sale pro-
ceeds to "stated capital," made the cushion remarkably devoid of pad-
ding. The ability to thereafter reduce stated capital (Model Act) or
72. Alternative section 45(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act provided:
(a) Dividends may be declared and paid in cash or property only out of the
unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the corporation, or out of the
unreserved and unrestricted net earnings of the current fiscal year and the
next preceding fiscal year taken as a single period ....
Had Alaska adopted this alternative formulation in former Alaska Statutes section
10.05.204(1), the board could have declared a dividend charged against recent short
term business profits notwithstanding that historical losses left the corporation with
total assets which exceeded total liabilities by an amount less than stated capital.
For a general discussion of the financial restraints imposed by the Model Act, see
Hackney, supra note 65. For the view that such restraints afforded precious little
protection to creditors and holders of investment interests not represented on the
board, see Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act - Invitation to Irresponsibil-
ity?, 50 Nw. U.L. Rv. 1 (1955). To Harris, the most insidious feature of the then
newly promulgated Model Act and its commentary was the failure to warn of the
significant shift away from shareholder protection embodied in both its terms and in
what had been deliberately excluded from its coverage.
Many legislators and others, not familiar with the technical operation and
ultimate effects of the recommended model provisions,.will rely on the fore-
words and prefaces published with the Model Acts. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the explanatory forewords and prefaces to the Model Acts do not call
attention to the specific changes nor give any explanation of the reason for
the trend of the successive drafts toward liberality and protection to manage-
ment and toward relaxation of safeguards to stockholders, creditors and the
public.
Harris, supra, at 2.
The answer which Harris did not find in the Model Act or its explanatory materi-
als may have been furnished by writers who view corporations as an umbrella or tent
within which a number of important contractual relationships may interact. Owners
of equity interests are but one of the contracting parties, and management must some-
how balance the interests of all. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
73. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.369 (1957) (repealed 1988).
74. Id. § 10.05.348. Section .360 afforded protection to the holders of a class or
series of shares having a liquidation preference. If the entity had such a class or series
of outstanding shares no reduction could be made which would reduce the amount of
stated capital to an amount equal to or less than the aggregate preferential amounts
payable in the event of involuntary liquidation. Id. § 10.05.360.
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directly charge distributions against it (Alaska Act) meant that what
may have begun as a thin cushion could wind up as a doily.
c. California and Model Act reform efforts. Within six months of
taking up the issue of distributions, the Commission prepared a draft
which proposed that Alaska join California in a statutory repudiation
of both the content and concepts of "legal capital" and "legal account-
ing."' 75 Several months after that draft was in place, the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association dropped what Dean Bayless
Manning was to term "the big bomb."' 76 Their proposed substitute
section 45 sought to eliminate legal capital and surplus. If the Califor-
nia and model legislation began from the same premise, their solutions
differed with respect to both ends and means. In essence, California
attempted to put mandatory padding in the creditor cushion.77 The
framers of the Revised Model Act abandoned the effort.
The California solution was both simple and direct. Unless the
corporation was, or giving prospective effect to the proposed distribu-
tion would be, unlikely to meet its liabilities as they mature, the direc-
tors were free to make any distribution to shareholders which could be
charged against retained corporate earnings.78 If the retained earnings
75. In 1975 the California Legislature was the first to act on the view that both
the balance and earned surplus concepts had become so riddled with exceptions that
they afforded no meaningful protection to corporate creditors and the holders of pre-
ferred stock if the owners of the common stock were determined to distribute corpo-
rate assets to themselves. Neither the idea that reform was needed nor the means
selected by the California Legislature was of recent origin. Both had been clearly
identified in the 1930s. See Littleton, A Substitute for Stated Capital, 17 HARV. Bus.
REV. 75 (1938); Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends
Under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229 (1935); Hills, Model Corpo-
ration Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (1935).
76. Manning, supra note 64, at 171.
77. Dean Manning's view of the California reforms is a mixture of admiration and
doubt:
These changes are a sensible move away from the conceptual and toward the
realities of economic and business analysis. At the same time, one must en-
tertain a certain skepticism as to whether the introduction of indenture-like
ratio provisions is warranted in a general corporation statute or will prove
administrable. The most likely outcome, one fears, is that the new provi-
sions will prove too technical for many purposes and too primitive for
others. And it is hard to muster confidence in a future role of California
state courts as accounting tribunals.
Manning, supra note 64, at 165.
78. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a) (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1990) contains the basic
permission to make distributions so long as the amount of retained earnings immedi-
ately prior thereto equals or exceeds the amount of the proposed distribution. Though
given subsequent legislative expression, section 501's formulation of the "equitable
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of the corporate entity did not equal or exceed the proposed distribu-
tion, it would still be licit provided that, immediately after it was
made, two statutorily defined ratios between corporate assets and lia-
bilities could be met. First, the total sum of corporate assets must
exceed the total sum of corporate liabilities by a ratio of 1.25 to 1.79
Put simply, the corporation must still have five dollars in assets for
every four dollars in liabilities. In addition, the current assets of the
corporation must at least equal its current liabilities.80 The goal of
these twin ratio/assets surplus tests was clearly to mandate a cushion
for the protection of corporate creditors.81
The means of achieving this goal involved the abolition of all con-
cepts of "par value" 82 and "surplus" invented by lawyers, and man-
dating that financial statements, balance sheets, income statements
and statements of changes in financial condition of a corporation be
prepared or determined in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles ("GAAP") then applicable.83 Two reforms were
instantly achieved with the passage of this mandate. First, the legal
profession ceded dominion over both the terminology and techniques
insolvency" test takes precedence in the sense that it will preclude a distribution per-
mitted under section 500(a) or (b) if the corporation is, or as a result of the distribu-
tion, would be rendered likely unable to meet its liabilities as they mature.
79. Id. § 500(b)(1). For purposes of this computation only, goodwill, capitalized
research and development expenses and deferred charges are excluded from the bal-
ance sheet. Id.
80. Id. § 500(b)(2). There was an important exception for highly leveraged cor-
porations or any entity struggling to service its debt. "[I]f the average of the earnings
of the corporation before taxes on income and before interest expense for the two
preceding fiscal years was less than the average of the interest expense of the corpora-
tion.. .," then the ratio of current assets to current liabilities had to be at least 1.25 to
1. Id.
81. The liquidation preference of the holders of senior shares in a corporation
with more than one class or series of stock was achieved by section 502. The dividend
preference of such senior shares is addressed by the requirement that any distribution
to junior shares be charged against retained earnings. CAL. CORP. CODE § 503 (Deer-
ing 1977 & Supp. 1989).
For a view that the California financials fail to go far enough in protecting the
interests of creditors, see Ben-Dror, An Empirical Study of Distribution Rules Under
California Corporations Code Section 500: Are Creditors Adequately Protected?, 16
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 375 (1983), discussed infra note 91.
82. The par value concept was preserved by the CGLC for the purpose of en-
abling corporations formed under its terms to be taxed by statutes or regulations pred-
icating the computation upon par value. For such purposes only, all authorized
shares are deemed to have a nominal par value of $1 per share. If any state or federal
statute or regulation requires par value for any other purpose, the CGLC authorizes
the board to satisfy the requirement by fixing a par value. CAL. CORP. CODE § 205
(Deering 1977 & Supp. 1989).
83. Id. § 114. All references to assets, liabilities, earnings, retained earnings and
similar accounting terms must also conform to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples ("GAAP"). Id.
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of accounting to the accounting profession. Second, the law was tied
to an evolutionary, non-static norm. Indeed, the idea that the ac-
counting profession is constantly seeking improved principles and
practices was cited by the framers of the Revised Model Business Cor-
poration Act to justify their refusal to mandate their observance.8 4
The proposed revision of section 45 of the Model Act followed
the California legislation in abandoning the concepts and terminology
of legal accounting.8 5 It did not seek to join California in crafting a
third generation statutory cushion for the protection of corporate
creditors.8 6 Instead, the Model Act recommended that statutory re-
form revert to the position of the common law of the 1880s wherein
the twin concepts of equitable insolvency and bankruptcy or absolute
insolvency would be the legal constraints upon the board's discretion
to distribute corporate assets to equitable owners.8 7 Three years later,
the drafters of the RMBCA elected to adhere to this preliminary judg-
ment.88 The official comment to section 6.40 declared:
The reformulation of the statutory standards governing distri-
butions is another important change made by the 1980 revisions to
the financial provisions of the Model Act. It has long been recog-
nized that the traditional "par value" and "stated capital" statutes
do not provide significant protection against distributions of capital
to shareholders. While most of these statutes contained elaborate
provisions establishing "stated capital," "capital surplus," and
84. Official comment 4(a) to RMBCA section 6.40 declares:
The widespread controversy concerning various accounting principles, and
their continuous reevaluation, suggest that a statutory standard of reasona-
bleness, rather than of generally accepted accounting principles, is
appropriate.
REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 6.40 comment 4(a) (1985).
85. The official comment, tracing the historical development of the 1980 amend-
ments, declared:
The 1980 financial amendments were based on the premise that the complex
structure of rules established by earlier versions of the Model Act did not
provide realistic protection to creditors or senior securities holders. These
rules were extremely technical and complex, and subject to manipulation so
that the protections provided by them often proved to be more apparent
than real....
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 484 (Supp. 1989).
86. The explanation for failing to embrace the California requirement of a ratio/
assets surplus is not to be found in the official comments or statutory comparison
published by the framers of the RMBCA. Indeed, the significant difference in both
goals and strategies is passed off with the comment that "California provides a treat-
ment of distributions that differs significantly from that provided in section 6.40." Id.
at 489.
87. Dean Manning, a member of the group which drafted the 1980 revision of the
Model Act, expressed satisfaction that there had been no effort to "put a new statutory
system in place that would seek to give creditors a stronger position." Manning, supra
note 64, at 179.
88. See REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 6.40(c) (1985).
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"earned surplus" (and often other types of surplus as well), the net
effect of most statutes was to permit the distribution to shareholders
of most or all of the corporation's net assets - its capital along with
its earnings - if the shareholders wished this to be done. However,
statutes also generally imposed an equity insolvency test on distri-
butions that prohibited distributions of assets if the corporation was
insolvent or if the distribution had the effect of making the corpora-
tion insolvent or unable to meet its obligations as they were pro-
jected to arise.
The financial provisions of the revised Model Act, which are
based on the 1980 amendments, sweep away all the distinctions
among the various types of surplus but retain restrictions on distri-
butions built around both the equity insolvency and balance sheet
tests of earlier statutes.8 9
While Dean Manning lauded the reliance upon the dual insol-
vency tests,90 others saw in it a dysfunctional, half-completed legisla-
tive agenda. A visiting Israeli scholar observed:
The dual insolvency test as it appears in the new Model Act has the
merit of simplicity, but is deficient in two major respects. First, the
dual insolvency test provides no consistent rule for determining the
amount of allowable distributions. Second, the dual insolvency test
merely serves to ascertain, rather than predict, bankruptcy and is
therefore useful only after the fact as a tool for litigation, not plan-
ning. Diligent creditors, unwilling to rely upon litigation in order to
collect debts, will be forced to exercise considerable preventive su-
pervision over corporate debtors and will incur substantial costs
monitoring the debtors' financial developments. 9
89. REv. MODEL BUSINESs CoRP. ACT § 6.40 official comment at 123 (1985).
The term "balance sheet test" as utilized in the official comment to section 6.40 is
potentially confusing. It clearly means insolvency in the absolute or bankruptcy sense
in which total assets no longer equal or exceed total corporate liabilities. It has no
relationship to the "balance sheet surplus" test utilized in New York and other juris-
dictions to assure some excess of total assets over total liabilities as a cushion for
creditors.
90. Manning, supra note 64, at 170-71, 179.
91. Ben-Dror, supra note 81, at 381 (footnotes omitted). Concluding that more is
needed than a concept of dual insolvency, Dr. Ben-Dror determined that the Califor-
nia approach also fails to go far enough to provide meaningful protection to creditors.
In Part III of his article, the author sets forth the goals and methodology of his empir-
ical study:
In order to examine the effectiveness of the California distribution rules,
an empirical study was conducted. This study applied the financial ratios
required by Section 500(b) to the financial statements of one hundred corpo-
rations that went bankrupt between 1970 and 1976. The application of Sec-
tion 500(1) for one, two, and three years prior to bankruptcy tested the
section's successful bankruptcy prediction rate during those years, or, in
other words, tested how often Section 500(b) would have prohibited distribu-
tions by corporations that subsequently went bankrupt.
Similarly, the study applied Section 500(b) to the financial statements of
a control group of 2451 solvent corporations during the same period in order
to test the incidence of overprediction by Section 500(b), that is, how often
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The framers of the RMBCA also rejected California's decision to
mandate observance of generally accepted accounting practices. In-
stead, section 6.40(d) declared:
The board of directors may base a determination that the distribu-
tion is not prohibited under subsection (c) either on financial state-
ments prepared on the basis of accounting practices and principles
that are reasonable in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or
other method that is reasonable in the circumstances. 92
The official comment expresses belief that requiring the observance of
GAAP is excessively rigid, though their use would be per se "reason-
able in the circumstances. ' 93 The concluding phrase, "or other
method that is reasonable in the circumstances," is touted as deliber-
ately suggesting "the wide variety of possibilities that might not be
considered to fall under a 'fair valuation' or 'current value' method but
might be reasonable in the circumstances of a particular case."'94
d. The financials of the new Alaska Corporations Code. The fi-
nancial provisions of the ACC can be summarized as containing the
substantive restraints espoused in the California statute wedded to the
the section would have prohibited distributions by corporations that contin-
ued to be solvent. The study also tested the sensitivity of Section 500(b) to
the size and industrial category of the corporation to which it was applied.
Finally, the study examined whether Section 500(a), the alternative test
which allows distributions to the extent of retained earnings, is by itself a
sufficient indicator of future solvency, and whether the efficiency of Section
500 would be improved if Sections 500(a) and 500(b) were applied cumula-
tively rather than as alternative tests.
Id. at 390-92 (footnotes omitted).
The author found an overprediction rate for section 500(b) of 9.14%, which was
greater than certain cited theoretical models. Id. at 400. Section 500(a) was found to
be a fallible indicator of future solvency. The stealth fact pattern was a corporation
with insufficient retained earnings to replace "resources, including obsolete plant and
equipment, which are necessary to sustain profitable operations - a dilemma particu-
larly acute during inflationary periods." Id. at 407. Significant improvement in the
prediction of future bankruptcy resulted from the application of section 500(a), (b) as
cumulative rather than alternative restraints upon the board's discretion to make a
distribution of corporate assets. Id. at 409. The author's conclusion and recommen-
dation was that the California Legislature consider amending section 500 to make the
two criteria one cumulative test. Id. at 413.
92. REv. MODEL BUSINEss'CORP. ACT § 6.40(d) (1985).
93. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. 479-80 (Supp. 1989).
94. Id. at 480. The use of the term "case" may well be prophetic, for it will
require litigation to ascertain the "reasonable" quality of any creative accounting prin-
ciples or practices employed by or relied upon by any given board. Dean Manning
had declared it "hard to muster confidence in a future role of California state courts as
accounting tribunals." Manning, supra note 64, at 165. With deference, at least Cali-
fornia courts would function in the context of an ascertainable norm. One marvels at
his assumed greater level of confidence in the ability of trial courts in a jurisdiction




procedural flexibility recommended by the RMBCA. Alaska thus be-
comes the second jurisdiction to adopt the ratio/assets surplus test in a
positive effort to afford a measure of protection for creditors. 95 As
initially enacted, the new code partially followed California in mandat-
ing observance of GAAP for the purpose of certain determinations
only.96 Amendments during the pre-effective date period have re-
pealed that position. 97 Like the Model Act, financial records, state-
ments and determinations need not conform to GAAP.9s Unlike the
Model Act, however, the amended provisions of the ACC contain a
standard to which any accounting practice or procedure must conform
and allocate the burden of proof in demonstrating its attainment.99
Shareholders seeking, or directors contemplating, a distribu-
tion °° of corporate assets should think of the ACC as imposing two
95. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.358(a)(2) (1989). In addition to providing restraints
upon the discretion of the board to make distributions to shareholders, the ACC pro-
vides an option which will give a measure of participatory security to holders of struc-
tured debt. An optional provision in the articles may confer upon the holders of debt
instruments the right to vote in the election of directors and on any other matters on
which shareholders may vote. Id. § 10.06.210(1)(H). The provision is modeled upon
section 204(a)(7) of the California Corporate Code. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(7)
(West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
Unfortunately, trade creditors, employees, and others who must rely upon the
assets of the corporation as a contract debtor lack the structured relationship neces-
sary to gain board representation under such an optional provision in the articles.
Further protections for both creditors and the holders of shares with dividend or
liquidation preference may be crafted in the articles, bylaws, share indentures or cor-
porate contracts. Section 10.06.375 of the Alaska Statutes declares that the financials
of the new code are a statutory minimum, and that nothing prohibits additional re-
strictions upon the declaration of dividends or the purchase or redemption of a corpo-
ration's own shares.
96. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
98. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.358(e) (1989); see also infra notes 122-23 and accom-
panying text.
99. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
100. The term "distribution" is defined in Alaska Statutes section 10.06.990(17):
"[D]istribution to its shareholders" means the transfer of cash or property by a corpo-
ration or its subsidiary to its shareholders without consideration, whether by way of
dividend or otherwise, except a dividend in shares of the corporation, or the purchase
or redemption of its shares for cash or property; . .. ."
This language is potentially confusing. At first glance it appears to state that a re-
demption of shares for cash or property is being excepted from the statutory definition
of a distribution. This is the exact opposite from the intended meaning as is clarified
in the balance of the provision fixing the time for the distribution. There we find that
"the time of a distribution by purchase or redemption of shares is the date cash or
property is transferred by the corporation ... " ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.940(17)
(1989).
There is an exception to the restrictions imposed by sections .358-.365 for the
purchase or redemption of the shares of a deceased shareholder. If the corporation
has purchased insurance on the shareholder's life to fund an obligation to purchase or
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* hurdles, each designed to safeguard the fiscal viability of the entity in
the wake of such a step. The first is the determination of equitable
solvency: the ability of the entity to meet its debts as they mature in
the ordinary course of business. Assuming that equitable insolvency is
not deemed a likely consequence, the dividend must pass muster as
chargeable against retained earnings or assets in excess of the twin
assets/surplus requirements.
(1) Equitable insolvency. Section .360 contains the formulation
of the equitable insolvency test:
A corporation or subsidiary of a corporation may not make a distri-
bution to the corporation's shareholders if the corporation or the
subsidiary making the distribution is, or as a result of the distribu-
tion would be, likely to be unable to meet its liabilities as they
mature. 101
There are two important changes in prior law.10 2 The equitable insol-
vency restraint in the former Alaska Business Corporation Act prohib-
ited distributions by a corporation which was insolvent or would be
rendered insolvent by such a step. 103 The new test errs on the side of
caution by prohibiting a distribution that would likely leave the corpo-
ration in such a condition.' °4 Section .360 also makes explicit refer-
ence to the "subsidiary of a corporation,"10 5 a factor which takes on
greater significance given the content of section .970, which contains
the general rules of construction and interpretation to be followed
under the ACC. 106 Section .970(5)(c) requires that if a corporation
has subsidiaries, all determinations must be made on a consolidated
basis taking into account the prospective effect of the distribution on
the financial viability of the entire corporate family, not merely its
most sound member.107
(2) The ratio/assets surplus test. The new code defines "retained
earnings" as "the account of the corporation representing undistrib-
uted and uncapitalized net profits, income, gains, and losses from the
redeem such shares, then to the extent that the proceeds from the policy exceed the
total amount of premiums paid, the funds may be freely used to carry out the corpo-
rate obligation. Id. § 10.06.368.
101. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.360 (1989). Section .360 is adapted from section 501
of the California Corporate Code. CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (Deering 1977 & Supp.
1989).
102. Section .360 replaces former section 10.05.210 of the Alaska Statutes.
103. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.210 (1957) (repealed 1988).
104. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.360 (1989). An effort to secure the repeal of this fea-
ture of section .360 was unsuccessful in the Sixteenth Legislature. Section 16 of Com-
bined Senate and House Bill 204 was deleted in the House Judiciary Committee.
105. Id.
106. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.970 (1989).
107. Id. § 10.06.970(5)(c).
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date of incorporation."' 0 8 This definition is crucial in determining the
ability of the corporation to qualify the proposed distribution under
section .358.
(a) A corporation or a subsidiary of the corporation may
not make a distribution to the corporation's shareholders, as
defined in [Alaska Statutes section] 10.06.990 [17], unless
(1) the amount of the retained earnings of the
corporation immediately before the distribution
equals or exceeds the amount of the proposed dis-
tribution; or
(2) immediately after giving effect to the distribu-
tion the
(A) sum of the assets of the corpora-
tion, exclusive of goodwill, capitalized re-
search and development expenses,
evidences of debts owing from directors
or officers or secured by the corporation's
own shares, and deferred charges, would
be at least equal to one and one-fourth
times its liabilities, not including deferred
taxes, deferred income, and other de-
ferred credits; and
(B) current assets of the corporation
would be at least equal to its current lia-
bilities or, if the average of the earnings of
the corporation before taxes on income
and before interest expenses for the two
preceding fiscal years was less than the
average of the interest expense of the cor-
poration for those fiscal years, at least
equal to one and one-fourth its current
liabilities.
(b) For purposes of this section,
(1) in determining the amount of the assets of the
corporation, profits derived from an exchange of
assets may not be included unless the assets re-
ceived are currently realizable in cash;
(2) "current assets" may include net amounts
that the board has determined in good faith may
reasonably be expected to be received from custom-
ers during the 12-month period used in calculating
current liabilities under existing contractual rela-
tionships obligating the customers to make fixed or
108. Id. § 10.06.990(36).
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periodic payments during the term of the contracts
after in each case giving effect to future costs not
then included in current liabilities but reasonably
expected to be incurred by the corporation in per-
forming the contracts. 10 9
Assuming that there is no threat of equitable insolvency, section
.358(a) defines two circumstances in which a distribution to sharehold-
ers by the corporation or its subsidiary is permitted.
Section .358(a)(1) concedes to the corporation discretion to make
any distribution so long as it can be charged against retained earnings.
The test is prospective in that immediately prior to this step the re-
tained earnings of the corporation must equal or exceed the proposed
distribution. A corporation with insufficient retained earnings may
still make a distribution provided that immediately afterwards it is
able to meet the twin ratio requirements for assets and liabilities set
forth in section .358(a)(2).
Under the first requirement, the sum of the corporate assets must
exceed the total of corporate liabilities by a ratio of 1.25 to 1. Thus, as
in California,110 following the distribution the corporation must have
at least five dollars in assets for every four dollars in liabilities. To
insure the soundness of this calculation, certain "assets" may not be
included because of their ephemeral quality or their unlikelihood of
being realized in cash. Also excluded from the asset calculation are
debts owing from directors or officers or any debt which is secured by
the corporation's own shares. 1 '
The second criterion focuses upon the prospective liquidity of the
corporation. The current assets must be at least equal to current cor-
porate liabilities.1 12 If the entity is highly leveraged, so that its earn-
ings in the two preceding fiscal years were less than the cost of debt
service during that period, that corporation must pass a more stringent
ratio whereby current assets exceed current liabilities by 1.25 to 1.113
(3) Accounting principles and practices to be observed under the
ACC. The current content of the ACC evolved in three distinct
109. Id. § 10.06.358.
110. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
111. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.358(a)(2)(A) (1989). The mandate to exclude debts of
corporate insiders is unique to Alaska law. Under the ACC, loans to directors, of-
ficers and employees are treated as distributions. See id. § 10.06.485(b). By the same
token, in calculating the total of corporate liabilities, deferred taxes, deferred income,
and deferred credits need not be reckoned. Id. § 10.06.358(a)(2)(A).
112. Id. § 10.06.358(a)(2)(B).
113. Id.
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stages, each representing interaction among the Commission, the legis-
lature, and critics who viewed the legislation as an "accountants' full-
employment bill."
In 1982, the Commission secured the initial introduction of the
ACC in the Alaska Senate.1 14 The requirement that all financial state-
ments, balance sheets, income statements, statements of change in fi-
nancial condition, and the like be prepared and determined in
accordance with GAAP was set forth in section .970(5).115 Neither
this general requirement, nor the more specific provisions respecting
corporate distributions, had drawn adverse comment during the circu-
lations period on the Commission's exposure draft. The Commission
was prepared for, and indeed encouraged, debate concerning its con-
troversial proposal which would have created secondary liability in
corporate directors and officers for the claims of certain unsecured
corporate creditors.1 16 It was not disappointed. A withering opposi-
tion soon was marshalled which branded the section on secondary lia-
bility as blatantly anti-capitalist. Disaffection also was manifest over
provisions mandating GAAP. They were assailed on the predicate of
a cost/benefit analysis. Critics pointed out that the great majority of
corporate entities in Alaska were small both in terms of the number of
114. S.B. 873, 12th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1982).
115. S.B. 24.6, 13th Leg., 1st Sess. 150-51 (1983). Section .970 as then proposed,
and now adopted, contains the basic rules of construction and interpretation which
govern the ACC. Subsection (5) originally declared:
(5) References in this chapter to financial statements, balance sheets, in-
come statements, and statements of changes in financial position of a corpo-
ration and references to assets, liabilities, earnings, retained earnings, and
similar accounting items of a corporation mean financial statements or items
prepared or determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles then applicable, and fairly presenting the matters that they pur-
port to present, subject to any specific accounting treatment required by a
particular section of this chapter. Unless otherwise expressly stated, refer-
ences in this chapter to financial statements mean, in the case of a corpora-
tion that has subsidiaries, consolidated statements of the corporation and
those of its subsidiaries as are required or permitted to be included in the
consolidated statements under generally accepted accounting principles then
applicable, and all references to these accounting items mean items deter-
mined on a consolidated basis in accordance with consolidated financial
statements.
Id. at 150-51.
Section .358(c) of Senate Bill 256 specifically mandated that the amount of a
distribution payable in property be determined on the basis of the value of the prop-
erty as carried on the corporation's financial statements in accordance with GAAP.
Id. at 28.
116. Section .488 concerning the secondary liability of directors and officers was
ultimately withdrawn by the Commission and does not appear in the ACC as enacted
in 1988. Both its terms and fate are discussed infra in Part III.
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participants and business receipts. For such entities, the cost of pro-
fessional accounting services was projected to outweigh the benefit to
either the immediate entity or the public.
The failure of the code to advance in the Twelfth Legislature had
been anticipated. The introduction came late on what was an already
overcrowded agenda. In April, 1983, the legislation was reintroduced
in the first session of the Thirteenth Legislature.'i 7 Extensive hearings
revealed substantial controversy regarding the provision on secondary
liability and the accounting features." 8s More than a year later, enact-
ment seemed no closer at hand. In the fall of 1984, the Commission
faced the prospect that unless a compromise could be crafted, there
was little reason for optimism that the Fourteenth Legislature would
overcome the reluctance displayed by its immediate predecessors and
embrace the new code.
As they approached their November meeting, the commissioners
were aware of the exposure draft of the RMBCA. The decision by
framers of the Model Act not to recommend mandatory adherence to
GAAP lent weighty support to the pragmatic arguments against the
content of section .970. Yet the formulation contained in RMBCA
section 6.40(d) was rejected as excessively vague. As they pondered
the matter, a consensus formed that the goal of statutory reform was
to secure corporate books, records, and statements which fairly and
reasonably presented their purported content. Mandatory observance
of GAAP had never represented a goal, merely the means to attain the
broader objective. Viewed in this light, section .970 was redrafted:
(5) subject to a specific accounting treatment required by a partic-
ular section of this chapter,
(A) references in this chapter to financial statements, balance
sheets, income statements, and statements of changes in financial
117. S.B. 246, H.B. 478, 13th Leg., 1st Sess. (1983).
118. There was also substantial support. On the day the code was introduced in
both houses, the President of the Alaska Federation of Natives wrote to the Chairman
of the Code Revision Commission with a copy to legislative leaders:
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Commission for fully
providing the AFN with the opportunity to review and comment on the
proposed Alaska Corporations Code. The AFN now supports passage of
Senate Bill No. 246 and House Bill No. 343.
The proposed Corporations Code is a comprehensive and generally
careful legislative scheme of good quality. Further, it is accompanied by a
technical commentary which can serve to reduce Native corporations' exten-
sive litigation costs. The finance section is an important reform, making pos-
sible some distributions from capital, but not jeopardizing creditors'
security. If you need us to testify on behalf of the Bill, we will do so.
Letter from Janie Leask to John W. Abbott (Apr. 8, 1983).
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position of a corporation and references to assets, liabilities, earn-
ings, retained earnings, and similar accounting items of a corpora-
tion mean financial statements or items prepared fairly and
reasonably to present the purported matters;
(B) financial statements prepared or determined in accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting principles then applicable
are fair and reasonable;
(C) references in this chapter to financial statements mean, in
the case of a corporation that has subsidiaries, consolidated state-
ments of the corporation and its subsidiaries, and all references to
accounting items determined on a consolidated basis in accordance
with consolidated financial statements .... 119
In this amended form, section .970 was enacted by the Fifteenth Legis-
lature.12 0 Notwithstanding this general concession, the enacted provi-
sions of the ACC required the observance of GAAP in determining
whether a distribution to shareholders was licit under the terms of
section .358 . 21
The third and final evolutionary stage of the ACC position on
accounting practices and procedures was attained during the pre-effec-
tive period. Three amendments revised the language of subsections (c)
and (d), and added subsections (e) and (f).1 22 Their net effect replaces
insistence upon the use of GAAP with a requirement that financial
determinations and statements be made according to practices and
principles fair and reasonable in the circumstances. Directors and of-
ficers are given clear warning as to the consequence of homemade ac-
counting strategies. Moreover, management will find a safe harbor in
the use of GAAP. Under subsection (f) they are per se fair and rea-
sonable. The fair and reasonable quality of statements or determina-
tions prepared or arrived at under other practices and principles shall,
in the event they are challenged, be proved by the corporation. 123
119. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.970(5) (1989).
120. 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 166, § 1.
121. Id.
122. 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 82, §§ 12, 13, 14.
123. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.358(f) (1989). In its final evolved form, section .358
provides:
(a) A corporation or a subsidiary of the corporation may not make a distri-
bution to the corporation's shareholders, as defined in [Alaska Statutes sec-
tion] 10.06.990(17), unless
(1) the amount of the retained earnings of the corporation imme-
diately before the distribution equals or exceeds the amount of the
proposed distribution; or
(2) immediately after giving effect to the distribution the
(A) sum of the assets of the corporation, exclusive of
goodwill, capitalized research and development expenses,
evidences of debts owing from directors or officers or se-
cured by the corporation's own shares, and deferred
charges, would be at least equal to one and one-fourth
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(4) The protection of senior shares. Section .365 applies only to
corporations with more than one class or series of shares outstanding,
one of which has a dividend preference. In such circumstances the
corporation may not make a distribution to the holders of the junior
shares unless it can be charged against retained earnings which, imme-
diately prior to the proposed distribution, equal or exceed the amount
of the distribution plus the aggregate amount of the cumulative divi-
dends in arrears on the senior shares. 124 Ironically, the new code af-
fords greater discretion to the board than was permitted under the
former act. Section .365 merely requires that the post-distribution
amount of corporate retained earnings equal or exceed the amount by
which any dividend owed to senior shares is in arrears. Under the
times its liabilities, not including deferred taxes, deferred
income, and other deferred credits; and
(B) current assets of the corporation would be at least
equal to its current liabilities or, if the average of the
earnings of the corporation before taxes on income and
before interest expenses for the two preceding fiscal years
was less than the average of the interest expense of the
corporation for those fiscal years, at least equal to one
and one-fourth its current liabilities.
(b) For purposes of this section,
(1) in determining the amount of the assets of the corporation,
profits derived from an exchange of assets may not be included
unless the assets received are currently realizable in cash;
(2) "current assets" may include net amounts that the board has
determined in good faith may reasonably be expected to be re-
ceived from customers during the 12-month period used in calcu-
lating current liabilities under existing contractual relationships
obligating the customers to make fixed or periodic payments dur-
ing the term of the contracts after in each case giving effect to fu-
ture costs not then included in current liabilities but reasonably
expected to be incurred by the corporation in performing the
contracts.
(c) For the purposes of this chapter, the amount of a distribution payable
in property shall be determined on the basis of the value at which the prop-
erty is carried on the corporation's financial statements in accordance with
this section.
(d) Only a corporation that classifies its assets as current assets and fixed
assets in accordance with this section is governed by (a)(2)(B) of this section.
(e) For the purposes of this section, the board of directors may base a de-
termination that a distribution is not prohibited either on financial state-
ments prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
or on the basis of accounting practices and principles that are fair and rea-
sonable in the circumstances.
(f) Financial statements and determinations prepared or arrived at in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles are fair and reason-
able. The fair and reasonable quality of statements and determinations
prepared under other practices and principles shall be proved by the
corporation.
Id. § 10.06.358.
124. Id. § 10.06.365.
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former act, such dividends had to be fully paid to the holders of the
senior shares before any distribution could be made to the holders of a
junior class or series. 125
It should be noted that nothing in the ACC directly protects the
dissolution preference of any class or series of shares from being im-
periled by a distribution to the common shares. A measure of protec-
tion is derived from the requirement that if the distribution cannot be
charged to retained earnings, then it cannot be made unless the total
assets of the corporation exceed its total liabilities by a ratio of 1.25 to
1. By contrast, section 6.40(c)(2) of the RMBCA directly guards the
dissolution preference of any class or series of shares. 126
125. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.207(3) (1957) (repealed 1988) ("A distribution may
not be made to the holders of a class of shares unless all cumulative dividends accrued
on all preferred or special classes of shares entitled to preferential dividends have been
fully paid.").
By contrast, section .365 would appear to remit holders of senior shares to a
contract claim if the board refuses to pay a dividend notwithstanding the presence of
adequate retained earnings. It does not appear that the Alaska Supreme Court has
ever been asked to pass upon such a claim. On the day it does, it will find precedent in
other jurisdictions which, from the investor perspective, is not promising. There is
widespread agreement that as between the corporation and a class or series of pre-
ferred shares the rights of the investors are essentially contractual in nature. Unless
the share indenture clearly mandates payment of a preferred dividend whenever such
a step is licit under the controlling statute, the holders of such securities will learn a
bitter lesson.
When a man buys stock instead of bonds he takes a greater risk in the busi-
ness. No one suggests that he has a right to dividends if there are no net
earnings. But the investment presupposes that the business is to go on, and
therefore even if there are net earnings, the holder of stock, preferred as well
as common, is entitled to have a dividend declared only out of such part of
them as can be applied to dividends consistently with a wise administration
of a going concern.
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1930). Attempts by the holders of
preferred shares to compel the declaration and payment of a dividend are doomed
absent a showing that the refusal of the board is a fraud or gross abuse of discretion.
Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 658-59 (Del. Ch. 1975). The
point is extensively discussed in Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F. Supp. 405, 418-19
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Most recently, Delaware law has been reviewed and restated in
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del. Ch. 1986).
126. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.40(c)(2) (1985). If the corporation
has such a class or series outstanding, the balance sheet insolvency test is augmented
by requiring that the total assets be at least equal to the total liabilities of the corpora-
tion plus the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to dissolve at the
time of the dissolution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of the senior
shares. Id.
Ironically, the RMBCA totally abandons any protection of the dividend prefer-
ence of senior shares. Under the terms of section 46(c) of the Model Act, no dividends
could be paid out of capital surplus unless all cumulative dividends accrued on all
preferred or special classes of stock and had been paid in full. MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AcT ANN. 938 (1971).
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III. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: THE
CRITICAL OMISSION FROM THE ACC
Nearly one hundred years ago, Sir Mackenzie Chalmers issued a
warning to those who would codify any area of the law. His message
can be reduced to four words: never try anything new. Violation of
that norm, Chalmers warned, is certain to result in every clause of the
proposed code being "looked at askance, and it is sure to encounter
opposition." 127 Chalmers was right. As they contemplated the oppor-
tunity to rethink the social contract implicit in a corporations code,
the commissioners sought a modest reform of a recurrent failure of the
legal system. The selected target was the plight of small creditors who
lack any pragmatic means of protecting themselves against an abuse of
the norm of limited liability. The suggested solution took the form of
section .488 of the exposure draft. Its retention in the legislation intro-
duced in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Legislatures proved an insur-
mountable obstacle to favorable consideration. Its removal produced
an atmosphere of constructive criticism and cooperation that eventu-
ally resulted in passage of the new code. In the relative quiet of hind-
sight, a brief summary of the debate may prove instructive. To the
extent that the Commission was correct in its belief that there is an
127. Burdick, A Revival of Codification, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 120 (1910) (quot-
ing Judge Chalmers). Chalmers' admonitions and strategies crossed the Atlantic in
1910:
Judge Chalmers tells us that the idea of codifying the law of negotiable in-
struments was first suggested by the Digest of the Law of Evidence; and he
ascribes the success of his Bill to the
wise lines laid down by Lord Herschell, who insisted that the Bill
should be introduced in a form which did nothing more than cod-
ify existing law, and that all amendments should be left to Parlia-
ment. A Bill," he adds, "which merely improves the form, without
altering the substance, of the law creates no opposition, and gives
very little room for controversy.... I am sure that further codify-
ing measures can be got through Parliament, if those in charge of
them will not attempt too much, but will be content to follow the
lines laid down by Lord Herschell. Let a codifying Bill in the first
instance simply reproduce existing law, however defective. If the
defects are patent and glaring it will be easy to get them amended.
If an amendment be opposed, it can be dropped without sacrificing
the Bill. The form of the law at any rate is improved, and its sub-
stance can always be amended by subsequent legislation. If a Bill
when introduced proposes to effect changes in the law, every clause
is looked at askance, and it is sure to encounter opposition.
Id.
Lord Herschell, the individual quoted by Chalmers, was a distinguished Victo-
rian parliamentarian who served in the House of Commons and later, after a brief
stint as Lord Chancellor, in the House of Lords. His career had an indirect bearing on
Alaska. Toward the end of his distinguished public service, he represented Great Brit-
ain in the disputes between Canada and the United States over fishing rights and
boundaries.
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unaddressed social problem, the answer must still be sought. To those
who may be contemplating recodification of corporate codes in other
jurisdictions, the history of the rise and fall of section .488 may prove
a useful footnote to the Chalmers admonition.
A. Limiting Limited Liability: A Common Law Perspective
No English-speaking jurisdiction regards the concept of limited
liability for the equitable owners of a corporation as inviolate.1 28 The
real issues are when, where, and under what circumstances the law
will look beyond the insufficient assets of a corporate debtor or
tortfeasor to impose broader liability. Unfortunately, some of the
sternest formulations of this possibility have been the least precise in
predicting its appropriate application. In what is perhaps the most
frequently cited general formulation an impatient federal district judge
declared:
A corporation, from one point of view, may be considered an entity,
without regard to its shareholders, yet the fact remains self-evident
that it is not in reality a person or thing distinct from its [constitu-
ent] parts. The word corporation is but a collective name for the
members who compose the association. If any general rule can be
laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a corporation
will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until
sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of
legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, pro-
tect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as
an association of persons .... 29
Twenty years later, Judge Cardozo surveyed briefs trading such labels
as "alias," "dummy," and "agent" and declared the issue to be lost in
"the mists of metaphor."' 30 The subsequent contribution of terms
such as "instrumentality" and "alter ego" has done little to clarify the
matter. Appropriately, even the exercise which the language is
designed to predict is shrouded in euphemism. Courts speak of
whether or not to "pierce the corporate veil."
Seeking to do better, one set of casebook editors recently ad-
vanced the following thesis:
[T]here are a variety of factors that may lead a court to impose
liability on a shareholder for the obligations of the corporation.
128. There is abundant classical literature. F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDI-
ARY CORPORATIONS (1933); I. WORMSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE
FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS (1927); Ballantine, Separate Entity of
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 12 (1925); Latty, The Corpo-
rate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REV. 597 (1936); Radin, The
Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932).
129. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905) (Sandborn, D.J.) (citations omitted).
130. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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They fall generally into two classes: (1) insufficient attention to cor-
porate formalities and (2) "abuse" of the corporate entity by push-
ing its advantages to extremes. A third category, perhaps best
exemplified in California, is to determine whether the corporation is
"undercapitalized." 131
Two other sets of factors appear to influence the outcome of any par-
ticular case: the identity of the plaintiff and the nature of the relief
sought. Tort victims may succeed where a contract claimant will fail.
The obvious factor is the inability of the former to have bargained for
a liability beyond the assets of the corporate tortfeasor. 132 Courts ap-
pear relatively comfortable in granting "enterprise reorganization"
wherein a parent is held answerable for the debts of a corporate sub-
sidiary or the assets of corporate siblings are exposed to liability.133 It
is quite another matter to expose the personal assets of individual
shareholders to claims generated against the corporation. 134 When
this is done, efforts are made to distinguish between active sharehold-
ers who controlled the entity, as opposed to those who were merely
passive investors.
135
It was not until the mid-1970s that such questions began to
trouble the Alaska Supreme Court. The early results were not promis-
ing from the vantage point of the plaintiffs' bar.
The court's first encounter with a bid to "pierce the corporate
veil" was brought by a tort victim, a plaintiff most likely to succeed,
seeking enterprise reorganization only, the prayer for relief most likely
to be granted. The plaintiff lost. In Jackson v. General Electric Co.,
131. L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POL-
ICY 241 (2d ed. 1988).
132. Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 347 n.6 (2d Cir. 1942).
In a different context Learned Hand captured the essence of the objection to
using legal doctrine to assist contract claimants who bypassed opportunities for self-
protection. "[I]n commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice to
seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves." James
Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933). Of course Hand's posi-
tion is dependent upon the assumption that there was a meaningful opportunity to
bargain over the risk which has now befallen the party seeking judicial relief. If the
economics of the exchange or the circumstances of the marketplace preclude such an
opportunity the plea for legal redress is made by a victim rather than a fool.
133. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966). In Walkovsky the majority concluded that the plaintiff tort victim had not
stated a claim against the sole shareholder even though the court assumed the suffi-
ciency of the complaint seeking enterprise reorganization. See also P. BLUMBERG,
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS (1987); Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent,
Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 589 (1975).
134. Walkovsky, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
135. Even California, which may be the most aggressive jurisdiction in seeking to
impose liability on the owners of thinly capitalized corporations which inflict tort inju-
ries, seeks to exempt passive investors. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 579-80,
15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (1961) (collecting authorities).
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the court refused to hold a parent liable for an intentional tort com-
mitted by a subsidiary. 136
There are a number of well-recognized exceptions to the rule that
ordinarily the parent corporation will not be held liable for the
wrongs of its wholly-owned subsidiary. For instance a parent cor-
poration may be held liable for its subsidiary's conduct when the
parent uses a separate corporate form to defeat public convenience,justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend crime. The parent corpora-
tion may also be liable for the wrongful conduct of its subsidiary
when the subsidiary is the mere instrumentality of the parent. Lia-
bility is imposed in such instances simply because the two corpora-
tions are so closely intertwined that they do not merit treatment as
separate entities. 137
Although the court did not cite to it, its first ground - the "big
wrong" -was lifted directly from Judge Sanborn's opinion in United
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co. 138
The court was more explicit in its attitude toward the instrumen-
tality theory and in providing guidance to the trial courts. It expressly
adopted as its own a test devised by Professor Frederick Powell evalu-
ating eleven criteria to determine whether a subsidiary was to be prop-
erly regarded as a "mere instrumentality of its parent." 139
136. Jackson v. General Elec. Co., 514 P.2d 1170, 1173-74 (Alaska 1973).
137. Id. at 1172-73 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that apart from these
doctrines another road to the parent's liability was to demonstrate that the subsidiary
acted in an agency capacity for the principal parent. The court pointed out that such
a result had nothing to do with "veil-piercing" since under classical agency concepts a
principal is liable for the torts of its agent. Id. at 1173 n.8.
138. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905). The immediate language adopted in Jackson was from Steven
v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp. Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173 n.7 (citing Steven,
324 F.2d 157, 169 (7th Cir. 1963)). Nor did the court give a label to its first theory. I
have appended the "big wrong" to impart the view that the plaintiff's success was
dependent upon demonstrating some significant transgression by the defendant in the
use of the corporate creature.
139. Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173. The eleven criteria were:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the
subsidiary.
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or
officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidi-
ary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of
the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent cor-
poration or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of its of-
ficers, the subsidiary is described as a department or division of the parent
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The court first addressed the issue in the context of a contract
claimant in 1978. In Shepherd v. Bering Sea Originals, 140 a secured
creditor of a bankrupt corporation complained that the proceeds from
a life insurance policy on the corporation's former president should
have been applied to reduce the amount owed to a senior creditor
rather than being used for the benefit of the corporation's sole share-
holder, the president's widow. In seeking that shareholder's personal
liability, the complaint alleged both undercapitalization and a failure
on the part of the defendant to observe a distinction between her per-
sonal affairs and corporate business.
In effect, Ms. Shepherd asks us to disregard the distinction between
the corporation and the sole shareholder and consider the insurance
benefits paid to Ms. Chase as though they belonged to the corpora-
tion. There are many decisions in which courts have pierced the
"veil of corporate fiction" and have held stockholders personally
liable for corporate obligations. As required in the interests of jus-
tice, corporate assets have been regarded as assets of an individual,
and an individual's assets have been held to inure to the benefit of a
corporation. Generally speaking, such decisions have been based on
the requirements of justice or to prevent fraud, bad faith or other
wrong. Where the stockholders have themselves disregarded the
corporate entity, the courts will sometimes do the same. Ms. Shep-
herd bases her attack on the contention that the corporation was
corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is referred to as the
parent corporation's own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own.
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in
the interest of the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corpora-
tion in the latter's interest.
(k) The formal legal requirements of.the subsidiary are not observed.
Id.
Four years after Jackson was decided tort victims failed to gain the liability of
controlling shareholders sought on the "alter ego" theory. In Elliott v. Brown, two
employees sued their corporate employer and supervisor to recover for injuries sus-
tained when they were assaulted by the supervisor. The supervisor happened to own
50% of the stock of Paxson Lodge, Inc., and was in daily control of its activities. The
plaintiffs sought to go beyond a workmen's compensation award to reach personal
assets of stockholders. The court concluded that workmen's compensation was not an
exclusive remedy. Indeed, it suggested a direct tort claim against the bellicose super-
visor. But it saw no occasion to disregard the limited liability presumptively raised by
the presence of the corporation.
Whatever these facts might suggest concerning Brown's control of the cor-
poration, they do not present a contested issue of fact concerning the appli-
cation of the alter ejo doctrine. This doctrine requires considerably more
than mere control; it exists to prevent a party from an advantage through
deceptive or manipulative conduct.
569 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Alaska 1977).
140. 578 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1978).
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inadequately capitalized and the further fact that the distinction be-
tween the corporation and Ms. Chase was not maintained with ref-
erence to the insurance policies in question. 141
The court reversed a grant of the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and remanded the cause for trial. The claim of thin capitali-
zation was dismissed on grounds that the plaintiff had participated in
the formation of the entity. The trial was to focus upon the manner in
which the sole shareholder had comported herself in distinguishing
personal from corporate matters.
In 1982, less than two months after the Commission secured the
introduction of its proposed code with its provision for secondary lia-
bility, the court decided Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co. 142 The telephone
company commenced a claim seeking loss of bargain damages for
breach of a contract to fabricate and install a custom business tele-
phone system. The contract was in the form of a lease with an option
to purchase the equipment. The plaintiff named as defendants the cor-
porate purchaser, Visions, Ltd., Uchitel Co., and Robert Uchitell.
Robert Uchitel was the part owner and chief executive officer of Vi-
sions, and the sole owner of Uchitel Co. It was conceded that he had
negotiated the contract with the telephone company and had the dom-
inant role in the daily running of Visions. The trial court granted a
judgment against all three defendants.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the exposure of
Uchitel Co. 143 However, the judgment as to the personal liability of
Robert Uchitel was reversed. The court found no evidence that Rob-
ert Uchitel had ever represented to the telephone company that he
would be personally liable. Thus his personal assets could be attacked
only if the corporate existence of Visions were disregarded and Uchitel
were reached as a controlling shareholder. 44 Citing Elliott v.
Brown, 145 the court asserted that proof of control standing alone was
an insufficient predicate. "[T]he veil may be pierced only if the corpo-
rate form is used 'to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit
fraud, or defend crime.' "146 The court then acknowledged that in
Jackson an alternative rationale, the instrumentality theory, had been
established. While that analysis had been developed in the context of
141. Id. at 590.
142. 646 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1982).
143. Id. at 233. While neither a parent nor subsidiary of Visions, Ltd., the lease
and option agreement had both featured Uchitel Co. as an apparent party. It was also
admitted that much of the equipment was to be housed in Uchitel Co.'s offices.
144. Id. at 234.
145. 569 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Alaska 1977).
146. Uchitel, 646 P.2d at 234 (quoting Elliott, 569 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Jackson,
514 P.2d at 1172-73)).
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the parent-subsidiary, it could be reformulated as a "quantitative ap-
proach" in determining liability in a shareholder-corporation setting.
In adapting the quantitative approach from the parent-subsidiary
cases to the individual shareholder-corporation context the follow-
ing factors should be considered: (a) whether the shareholder
sought to be charged owns all or most of the stock of the corpora-
tion; (b) whether the shareholder has subscribed to all of the capital
stock of the corporation or otherwise caused its incorporation; (c)
whether the corporation has grossly inadequate capital; (d) whether
the shareholder uses the property of the corporation as his own; (e)
whether the directors or executives of the corporation act indepen-
dently in the interest of the corporation or simply take their orders
from the shareholder in the latter's interest; (f) whether the formal
legal requirements of the corporation are observed. 147
Finding that none of these elements suggested the personal liability of
Robert Uchitel, the court reversed the judgment. 48
Once again the defendant prevailed and the corporate integrity
was a barrier to shareholder liability. But the supreme irony was that
with the plaintiff's defeat in Uchitel, coupled with the court's express
recollection of its initial position in Jackson, the seeds of future plain-
tiff victories had flowered. In Uchitel, after spending nearly a decade
pondering an ill-defined area of the law, the court found terminology
and criteria with which it was comfortable. It preferred the "quantita-
tive approach" in determining enterprise reorganization or the per-
sonal liability of individual shareholders. The criteria differed, but
each instance featured an inquiry into the adequacy of capitalization,
the existence or non-existence of an independent economic identity of
the entity, and the observance of both formal and functional aspects of
a corporate identity.
Uchitel was decided on June 18, 1982. Its impact was almost im-
mediate. On August 6, 1982, the court handed down its decision in
Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon and Black/Dawson & Co. 149 Corroon, the
plaintiff, brought contract claims totalling nearly $300,000 for insur-
ance premiums which his company had advanced on open account.
The immediate corporate debtor, Eagle Air, Inc., was an Alaska cor-
poration acquired in 1975 as the northern tip of a corporate iceberg
controlled by Stanley Taggares in his capacity as president and owner
of 998 of the 1000 shares in Taggares Helicopters, Inc. Taggares Heli-
copters was a Washington corporation which at one time pursued an
aviation career but had receded to the status of a holding company.
The picture was completed with the formation of Taggares Leasing,
Inc., an Oregon corporation formed for tax purposes.
147. Id. at 235 (citing Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173).
148. Id.
149. 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982).
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Plaintiff had a history of business dealings with Eagle Air prior to
its acquisition by Taggares Helicopters. He functioned as the insur-
ance broker obtaining insurance coverage and then billing Eagle Air
for the premiums. In the meantime he fronted the premium amounts
to the carriers. Within less than a year of the sale to Taggares, Eagle
Air had run up an open account balance of nearly $200,000. Stanley
Taggares eventually executed a promissory note covering this debt in
his capacity as president of Eagle Air and Taggares Leasing. He spe-
cifically refused to execute the note in his individual capacity. After
making a few installment payments, the makers defaulted on the note,
but not before Eagle had managed to run up an additional tab of more
than $113,000 with Corroon's agency.
The plaintiff commenced an action for the unpaid balance on the
note and the open account. His complaint sought to go beyond the
assets of Eagle Air to claim the funds of Taggares Helicopters, Tag-
gares Leasing, Stanley Taggares, and his marital estate. The trial
judge found that Stanley Taggares had drained off the assets of Eagle
Air and Taggares Leasing through what the court described as "com-
plex financial transactions."1 50 It also found that Eagle and the other
Taggares corporations were mere instrumentalities of Stanley Tag-
gares. Accordingly, it judged each of the defendants jointly and sever-
ally liable for the full amount of the note and account balance.
On appeal, Stanley Taggares contended that there had been no
proof of anything beyond his "control" of the corporate entities, a fac-
tor which under prior Alaska decisions had been deemed insufficient
to warrant disregard of shareholder limited liability. His great misfor-
tune was to raise this contention in the immediate wake of the court's
identification of its "quantitative approach."151 The Alaska Supreme
Court noted that the trial judge had correctly applied the eleven crite-
ria in his quantitative approach to the parent-subsidiary issues, and
had correctly used the six criteria enunciated in Uchitel to determine
the issue of shareholder liability. Justice Connor was forced to ac-
knowledge that there were Alaska cases which had "relegated the
'quantitative' approach to secondary importance" in favor of a test
which sought evidence of the use of a corporate entity "to defeat pub-
lic convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend crime."1 52 To
the extent that these cases still mattered, the court deemed the finding
of draining off the assets of Eagle Air a sufficient wrong.1 53 The "big
wrong" was being deflated.
150. Id. at 1004.
151. Id. at 1003-04.
152. Id. at 1004 (quoting General Constr. Co. v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 629 P.2d
981, 983 (Alaska 1981)).
153. Id. at 1005.
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Less than a year after the decision in Eagle Air the court noted in
McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co. 154 that in order to impose liability on a
corporate parent under the quantitative approach it was not necessary
that each of the eleven criteria be satisfied. 155 Chief Justice Burke
noted that in Alaska a plaintiff could choose between two instrumen-
tality theories: proof that the defendant had used the corporate entity
to "defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend
crime," or the quantitative approach which disregarded the corporate
existence "simply because the two corporations are so closely inter-
twined that they do not merit treatment as separate entities."1 56 It
surely came as no surprise to the court that the plaintiff asserted its bid
under the quantitative approach.
In 1987, the court moved to make the increasingly-abandoned
"proof of serious wrong" alternative more attractive.1 57 Employees of
a resort hotel sued their corporate employer and its sole shareholder.
Their claim was for back wages and refusal to pay a promised bonus.
Since the plaintiffs had not satisfied the express condition precedent to
the bonus obligation, they sought damages on a theory that the de-
fendant had breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. The trial court awarded the disputed sums and pierced the
corporate veil of Klondike Industries Corporation so as to reach the
assets of Wiley Beaux, the sole shareholder. On appeal, the court re-
versed that aspect of the judgment which pertained to the alleged
breach of the covenant of good faith dealing. It affirmed the disregard
of the corporate existence of Klondike Industries and the imposition
of personal liability on Wiley Beaux. It noted that prior Alaska prece-
dent sanctioned such liability if a shareholder had used a corporation
"to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend
crime." 58 It now held that proof that Beaux had transferred operat-
ing funds into and out of Klondike in circumstances which made the
plaintiffs monthly salaries "occasionally unavailable [amounted to]
prejudice.., sufficient to uphold the trial court's decision to pierce the
corporate veil." 159 The "big" had gone out of the "wrong."
B. Section .488: Secondary Liability for Directors and Officers
From Jackson to Klondike Industries, neither the terms nor the
goals of section .488 were directly implicated. And yet each of the
154. 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983).
155. Id. at 1230.
156. Id. at 1229-30 (quoting Jackson v. General Elec. Co., 514 P.2d 1170, 1173
(Alaska 1973)).
157. Klondike Indus. Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987).
158. Id. at 1171 (quoting Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon and Black/Dawson & Co.,
648 P.2d 1000, 1004-05 (Alaska 1982)).
159. Id. at 1171-72.
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failed corporate entities almost certainly left unpaid employees, mate-
rialmen, and. suppliers for whom the court's evolving attitudes on the
"big wrong" versus the "quantitative approach" were academic, be-
cause their claims were not for hundreds of thousands but for hun-
dreds or a few thousand dollars. The costs of litigation placed the
exercise of veil piercing beyond their means. If the commissioners
needed "text." from which to call for the redress of this situation, they
could not have improved on the words of a trial judge who had spoken
years earlier on the social costs of an allied problem:
The steady recurrence of conditional sales problems, while not in-
volving in any instance a large sum, is of seeming importance in that
they constantly touch many lives, causing some financial hardship;
but, beyond the money loss, their judicial treatment in some in-
stances has left a vivid sense of injustice lingering with the lowly,
who, for the most part, are not capable of subtle legalistic
analysis. 60
In the view of the commissioners, the plight of small creditors of cor-
porations was worse. The barrier they faced was created by the state.
Without the positive provision of law, no person enjoys "limited liabil-
ity." Further, their grievance was not with the tone of their judicial
treatment. It was a cost structure which placed the judiciary beyond
their reach.
On March 24, 1982, Senate Bill 873 was introduced in the Second
Session of the Twelfth Legislature. It contained the following
provision:
Sec. .488. SECONDARY LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS.
(a) Except as exempted in (b) of this section and limited
in (c) of this section, incorporators, directors, other than a
provisional director appointed under [Alaska Statutes sec-
tion] 10.06.640, or individuals exercising the authority of
directors as permitted in [Alaska Statutes section]
10.06.450(a), and the president, secretary and treasurer, or
individuals performing the functions of these offices in a
domestic or foreign corporation doing business in this
state, are, to the extent that the assets of the corporate
entity prove insufficient, jointly and severally liable for the
contract indebtedness, whether formal or otherwise, for
materials, supplies, inventory, or services furnished in the
state during their period of service.
(b) The terms of a written contract between a corpora-
tion and a third party may modify or preclude the liability
created by this section.
160. Buffalo Indus. Bank v. DeMarzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 784




(e) Notwithstanding division by assignment or other-
wise, the total secondary liability created by this section
for the benefit of a creditor under (a) of this section may
not exceed $25,000 exclusive of costs of collection.
(d) A party against whom a claim is asserted under this
section is entitled to contribution from other persons enu-
merated in (a) of this section.161
The idea of imposing secondary liability upon the directors and
certain corporate officers is without precedent in corporate law. As
indicated, it seeks to provide relief to a class of creditors who are be-
yond the pale of traditional common law restraints on limited liability.
It is important to recognize that section .488 would not have man-
dated such liability. It could either be reduced or totally eliminated by
the terms of any written contract between the corporate entity and the
third party. Thus, the relief was in default of the corporate actors
having taken steps to bargain over the matter. Further, the liability
created by section .488 is identical to the one faced by every proprie-
tor, partner, and joint venturer each day she steps into the market-
place. Indeed, such persons face no ceiling of $25,000 per claimant,
the original proposal in section .488.162
If the imposition of secondary liability on certain officers and cor-
porate directors is novel, imposing such liability on shareholders is
not. In both New York and Wisconsin there literally has never been a
day in which such liability has not existed in favor of employee claims
for unpaid wages. In New York, the current statute imposes secon-
dary liability upon the ten largest shareholders in any corporation not
publicly trading its equity shares. 163 Wisconsin makes shareholders
liable for an amount equal to the par value of their shares, or the con-
sideration paid for shares without par value for all debts owed to em-
ployees of the corporation for services performed in the preceding six
months. 164
161. S.B. 873, 12th Leg., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1982).
162. Id. at 65. In 1987, the Commission proposed reducing the ceiling on liability
from $25,000 to $2,500 per creditor. The compromise won few converts. Legislative
supporters of section .488 were disappointed at the prospect of reducing its pragmatic
impact. Opponents continued to resist the idea that, absent some demonstration of
"fault," directors and the designated corporate officers should have any liability at all.
163. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1986). The liability is joint and
several. Sasso v. Gallucci contains a discussion of the means employed to ascertain
the identity of the ten largest shareholders. 112 Misc. 2d 865, 447 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1982).
164. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.40(6) (West 1957 & Supp. 1989). See Joncas v. Krue-
ger, 61 Wis. 2d 529, 213 N.W.2d 1 (1973). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held
that the liability is not limited by the necessity that the employee services have been
performed within that state. Clokus v. Hollister Min. Co., 92 Wis. 325, 66 N.W. 398
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The initial proposal considered by the Commission would have
followed the New York precedent while expanding it to include liabil-
ity for claims of creditors for materials, supplies, inventory and serv-
ices extended on open account. Such extenders of credit are
traditionally unsecured in the marketplace, and the debt obligations
are not reflected in formal written contracts. The idea was abandoned
given the perception that shareholders who might drift into and out of
the "top ten" might be individuals who had little pragmatic opportu-
nity to discipline those in control of the corporation. Yet, it is clear
that control lies with directors and officers. It was for that reason that
they replaced shareholders in the formulation of section .488. Under
the terms of section .488(b) liability would arise only for debts or obli-
gations incurred during their tenure in office.165
The liability which would have been created by section .488 could
not be evaded by the expedient of seeking foreign incorporation of a
business which would then operate in Alaska.' 66
Tort claimants were excluded from section .488 on grounds that
contingent fee arrangements would normally suffice to guarantee an
audience in court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lord Herschell was no foe of law reform conducted through leg-
islation. He simply cautioned against the advisability of attempting its
accomplishment in the context of codification. Aside from his tactical
advice, he expressed optimism that if a defect is "patent and glaring it
will be easy to get [the code] amended."' 67 The ACC is now in place.
In it much was accomplished. Ultimately the strengths and deficien-
cies in both the arguments over the need for reform, and the wisdom
of the path indicated by section .488, are determinations for a future
Alaska Legislature.
(1896). Nor is there any necessity that the employee first obtain an unsatisfied judg-
ment against the corporate employer. Sleeper v. Goodwin, 67 Wis. 577, 31 N.W. 335
(1887).
165. S.B. 873, 12th Leg., 2d Sess. 65 (1982).
166. Under section .488(a) liability would have been imposed upon the president,
secretary and treasurer of an Alaska or foreign corporation or upon individuals per-
forming the functions of those offices in a foreign corporation.
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ARTICLE 1. CORPORATE PURPOSES AND POWERS
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ACC ABCA MBCA CGCL NYBCL OTHER RMBCA
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ARTICLE 10. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS




























































ACC ABCA MBCA CGCL NYBCL OTHER RMBCA
.963 X X
.965 X X P X
.968 X
.970 X
.990 P P P P
.995 P P
"X" indicates the presence of identical or functionally
identical statutory language.
"P"p indicates the presence of partial congruence between the
ACC and the source code or the RMBCA. The
"origin" and "comparison" discussion for each section
of the ACC should be consulted in order to determine
the differences.
ACC: The Alaska Corporations Code, Alaska Statutes 10.06
ABCA: The Alaska Business Corporations act, former Alaska
Statutes 10.05
MBCA: Model Business Corporations Act
CGCL: California General Corporations Law
NYBCL: New York Business Corporations Law
RMBCA: Revised Model Business Corporations Act
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